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I. INTRODUCTION
Recovery of solely economic losses in tort is problematic. There is
an often-expressed concern that, if economic loss were recoverable in
tort, "contract law would drown in a sea of tort."' There is also a belief
that "[p]ermitting recovery of all foreseeable claims for purely eco-
nomic loss could make a [tortfeasor] liable for vast sums." Set off
against such concerns is the tenet that "[t]he risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."' The tension among these
viewpoints and the policies and perspectives underlying the respec-
tive domains of tort and contract have combined to produce a rich and
sometimes-contradictory body of case law.
The dissension between tort and contract reflects in part alterna-
tive approaches to structuring human relations. Tort is a domain of
socially imposed duties; contract, on the other hand, is based on
nominally consensual duties created by agreement. Tort establishes
and enforces those safety requirements society deems minimally nec-
essary; contract enforces representations of the quality of the things
to be exchanged between the parties. Tort generally - though not al-
ways - requires fault (negligence or intent) as a predicate of liability;
contract does not require fault, only a failure to perform the obligation
as warranted. Tort protects interests in person, property, and rela-
tions by providing remedies designed to restore the status quo ante;
contract protects the expectations of the parties at the time of the
promise by providing benefit-of-the-bargain remedies. In short, tort
protects existing interests and entitlements against intrusions, while
1. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866
(1986). See also GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974) ("contract' is being
reabsorbed into the mainstream of'tort.").
2. East River Steamship, 476 U.S. at 874.
3. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.). As
the Idaho Supreme Court long ago noted, "It is contrary to natural justice to say.., that
the plaintiffs ... must suffer their loss in silence, and the defendant ... is under no obli-
gation to compensate plaintiffs for their loss." Wilson v. Boise City, 6 Idaho 391, 399, 55 P.
887, 890 (1899).
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contract permits the reallocation of those entitlements. In a society
where ideas of individual autonomy often masquerade as founding
principles, the socially imposed duties of tort may seem less congenial
than the personally assumed duties of contract. This is particularly
likely in an age when the myth of the individual is again abroad in
the land and the glorification of self-interest and laissez-faire ideology
is the order of the day.' The choice has a broader dimension as well.
As Grant Gilmore noted, a legal system that emphasizes freedom of
contract "must ultimately work to the benefit of the rich and power-
ful, who are in a position to look after themselves."5
One of the leading Idaho cases on the recovery of economic loss in
tort - Clark v. International Harvester Co.' - strikes a balance be-
tween tort concerns for safety and contract's focus on quality:
The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due
care to build a tractor that does not harm person or property.
If the defendant fails to exercise such due care it is of course
liable for the resulting injury to person or property as well as
other losses which naturally follow from that injury. However,
the law of negligence does not impose on International Har-
vester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough and
breaks d6wn infrequently enough for Clark to make a profit in
his custom farming business. This is not to say that such a
duty could not arise by a warranty - express or implied - by
agreement of the parties or by representations of the defen-
dant, but the law of negligence imposes no such duty. 7
As the court states, one marker along the boundary between the
realms of tort and contract is the nature of the loss plaintiff suffers:8
as a general rule, a person who suffers "pure" economic loss9 cannot
4. For ideologically pure statements, see CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE (1981); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973).
5. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 95.
6. 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
7. Id. at 336, 581 P.2d at 794 (footnote omitted).
8. There are, of course, other markers along the boundary. For example, the
Idaho Supreme Court has held that emotional distress cannot be sought when the rela-
tionship between the parties arises out of a contract. In such cases, plaintiff must seek
punitive damages. See Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 669 P.2d 1371 (1985). But see Wal-
ston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 218-20, 923 P.2d 456, 463-65 (1996)
(emotional distress may be recovered in a relationship based on contract when there is a
special relationship between the parties).
9. "Pure" economic loss is an economic loss independent of physical injury to
the plaintiff's person or property. The qualification is essential because economic losses
are fully recoverable when a plaintiff has also suffered personal injury or property dam-
age. E.g., L & L Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Boise Water Corp., 120 Idaho 107, 813 P.2d 918
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recover in tort; recovery for such losses is restricted to contract. More
formally, there generally is no tort duty to avoid conduct that causes
only economic harm; duty to prevent economic harm must generally
be assumed in contract. When a person suffers neither personal in-
jury nor property damage - when she seeks to recover pure economic
losses - the rationale for tort recovery is at its weakest because the
plaintiff and her property were not endangered. In such cases, leaving
the parties to their bargained-for agreement reinforces the core prin-
ciples of both domains of law: disappointed but not endangered plain-
tiffs are relegated to contract and their agreed-upon responsibilities.
Not all cases involving pure economic loss implicate the
tort/contract boundary. The absence of a contract between the parties
renders the boundary issues largely irrelevant. That is, contract is not
implicated when the parties are not in privity. Although this now
seems obvious, it was not always understood. In fact, until the first
decades of this century, the existence of a contract for the sale of
product served to preclude the manufacturer's liability to a person not
in privity with the manufacturer even for physical injuries to that
person.'0 In the leading case - Winterbottom v. Wright" - the court
held that plaintiff, a coachman, could not sue the repairer of the
stagecoach he was driving when its wheel fell off, laming him. The
court thought the possible liability too expansive:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if
the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person
passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of
the coach might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the
operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered
into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to
which I can see no limit, would ensue. 2
It was more than seventy years before Benjamin Cardozo authored
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 3 holding that the driver of an auto-
mobile could sue the remote manufacturer in tort for injuries when
the wheel fell off his car:
(Ct. App. 1991) (property damage); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421
(1974) (personal injury).
10. This distinction has a long and particularly well-known history since it is the
central storyline in the series of cases tracing the evolution of products liability. See
EDWARD H. Lvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6-19 (1948).
11. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842).
12. Id. at 405 (Abinger, C.B.); see also Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co.,
120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
13. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life
and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be fore-
seen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the
source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its
source in the law."'
Although the court in Winterbottom relied on the contract be-
tween the owner of the stagecoach and its repairer, it did so for li-
ability-limitation reasons. The court did not fear the demise of con-
tract but rather the unlimited damages that tort seemingly allowed:
"[I]f the [driver of the coach] can sue, every passenger, or even any
person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of
the coach might bring a similar action."15 Privity of contract was im-
portant because it served to limit liability, not because the prohibition
against a tort action reinforced contract principles. Similar concerns
with unlimited liability still motivate courts. In a companion case to
Clark - Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co.16 - the Idaho Su-
preme Court noted:
Though the rule [against recovery of pure economic loss]
has been expressed in different ways, the common underlying
pragmatic consideration is that a contrary rule, which would
allow compensation for losses of economic advantage caused
by the defendant's negligence, would impose too heavy and
unpredictable a burden on the defendant's conduct.
... In contrast to the recognized liability for personal in-
juries and property damage, with its inherent limitations of
size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercus-
sions of a negligent act would be virtually open-ended. 17
Economic loss cases thus may implicate two different concerns.
On the one hand, when there is a contract between the parties, the
socially imposed duties of tort are a potential threat to the bargained-
for duties of contract: contract may "drown in a sea of tort.'" On the
other hand, when there is no contract between the parties, the expan-
sive, rippling-circle of potential economic loss with its specter of un-
14. Id. at 1053. MacPherson and its progeny are examined in William L. Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
15. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405 (Abinger, C.B.).
16. 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978).
17. Id. at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005 (citations omitted); see also Cain v. Vollmer, 19
Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910).
18. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delval, Inc., 476 U.S. at 866.
1998]
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limited and disproportionate liability gives courts justifiable pause.'9
Although pure economic loss is present in both situations, the ration-
ales for denying recovery are markedly different in the two situations.
At the same time, the per se rule against the recovery of eco-
nomic loss in tort has long been riddled with exceptions, qualifica-
tions, and clarifications. This not only demonstrates the degree to
which Idaho courts are uncomfortable with a per se no-duty rule, it
also reveals the degree to which the nonliability rule is artificial when
"[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." 0
A recent decision by the Idaho Supreme Court - Duffin v. Idaho
Crop Improvement Ass'n2 ' - offers an opportunity to review the Idaho
caseload on recovery for economic losses in tort. The court in Duffin
presented its own review of the case law, concluding that the cases
present "a general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic
losses in all negligence actions" subject to two exceptions. 2  A more
comprehensive review will demonstrate, however, that the law is ac-
tually a good deal less tidy than the court suggests.
II. DUFFIN v. IDAHO CROP IMPROVEMENT ASS'N
Eric and Melanie Duffin grew potatoes on their farm near Aber-
deen, Idaho. Following discussions with the president of Crater
Farms, Inc. (CFI), the Duffins agreed to plant seed potatoes produced
by CFI if the seed was "certified." Certification is conferred by the
Idaho Crop Improvement Association (ICIA), the delegatee of certain
statutory authorities conferred on the University of Idaho. The certifi-
cation program is intended to maintain genetic purity and to ensure
that the seed is free of diseases and pests; it is conferred after a series
of inspections and tests. ICIA certified the CFI seed potatoes; CFI de-
livered the potatoes to the Duffins in March and early April, 1988. At
the end of April, however, an additional ICIA inspection determined
that the CFI potatoes were infected with bacterial ring rot. ICIA
therefore informed CFI that no further shipments could be sold as
certified. Neither CFI nor ICIA informed the Duffins of the problem.
The Duffins subsequently discovered that their crop was also infected.
They brought suit against CFI on various contractual theories and
19. In the classic Cardozo phrase, to hold an accountant liable to non-contracting
parties for negligently auditing books exposed the accountant to liability "in an indeter-
minate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co., 175 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
20. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.).
21. 126 Idaho 1002, 895 P.2d 1195 (1995). A companion case - Feld v. Idaho
Crop Improvement As'n, 126 Idaho 1014, 895 P.2d 1207 (1995) - presented essentially
identical facts and was decided on the basis of Duffin.
22. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200.
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against ICIA for negligence, alleging that they had suffered three
types of economic losses:
(1) the excess of the price paid for the seed because it was
"certified"; (2) lost revenues which resulted from reduced
yields; and (3) lost revenues which resulted from having to
sell the crop immediately upon harvest, rather than by way of
the more lucrative contracts the Duffins had already negoti-
ated, or by waiting until the open market prices were higher.23
The trial court granted ICIA summary judgment, holding that the
Duffins' claim was for pure economic loss and thus could not be recov-
ered in a tort action 4 and that the Duffins could not recover for negli-
gent misrepresentation.2 5 The Duffins appealed the dismissal of ICIA;
the supreme court reversed the trial court's decision on the economic
loss issue but affirmed its decision on negligent misrepresentation.
The supreme court began its analysis of the economic-loss issue
with the two cases that define the issue in Idaho, Clark v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co. 2' and Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co. 27
The court concluded that the decisions precluded recovery for pure
economic loss in tort because in such cases "the defendant's conduct
did not invade an interest of the plaintiff to which the law of negli-
gence extended its protection."2 That is, there was no duty in tort to
avoid conduct that invades an exclusively economic interest: "Fol-
lowing Just's," the court wrote, 'this Court has adhered to a general
rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses in all negli-
gence actions."2 9
This general rule applied only to "pure" economic loss. Economic
losses are recoverable when they are accompanied by either personal
injury or property damage." Thus, if the Duffins had suffered either
23. Id. at 1005, 895 P.2d at 1198.
24. Id. at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199.
25. Id. at 1009-10, 895 P.2d at 1202-03, The trial court also held that ICIA was
an instrumentality of the state and that the Idaho Tort Claims Act therefore applied. Id.
at 1008-09, 895 P.2d at 1201-02. The case presented additional issues on the existence of
warranties and the effectiveness of disclaimers in the dealings between the Duffins and
CFI. The trial court denied cross-motions for summary judgment on these issues; the su-
preme court affirmed those decision. Id. at 1010-13, 895 P.2d at 1203-06.
26. 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
27. 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978).
28. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200.
29. Id.
30. The court actually writes that "there are exceptions to the general rule of
non-recovery" of "purely economic losses in a negligence action." Duffin, 126 Idaho at
1007, 895 P.2d at 1200. The first of these, it states, is that "economic loss is recoverable in
tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or property." Id. This "exception" is not in
fact an exception to the "general rule prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses in
1998]
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personal injuries or property damage, they could also recover for any
economic losses arising from the same event. The distinction between
'pure economic loss" and other economic loss required the court to dis-
tinguish between personal injury, property damage, and economic
loss. It did so by reaffirming a distinction initially announced in
Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.: ' dam-
age to property that was the basis of the transaction between the par-
ties is economic loss while damage to non-transactional property is
property damage. Since the damage in Duffin was to the seed pota-
toes that were the basis of the transaction among the parties, the
court held that the damages were economic loss rather than property
damage. And since that loss was not accompanied by either personal
injuries or property damage it presumptively fell within the general
rule against the recovery of pure economic loss in tort.
The rule against recovery of pure economic loss is not, however,
absolute. The court therefore turned to two exceptions to the general
rule against recovery of economic loss in tort that it recognized.
The court's first exception - that economic loss "might be recov-
ered in tort where the occurrence of a unique circumstance requires a
different allocation of the risk 3 - is enigmatic. At a trivial level, of
course, all cases present "a unique circumstance" - what Paul Simon
has aptly called "the myth of fingerprints. '33 Presumably some
"unique circumstances" are important and others are not. The court,
however, fails to offer anything beyond a citation to Just's34 and the
assertion that "the certification of seed potatoes is not a 'unique cir-
cumstance' requiring a re-allocation of the risk. 3 5 Neither the enig-
matic phrase nor the mere assertion of its inapplicability are of much
assistance in determining the content or the scope of the exception.
The second exception, the court stated, 'Is applicable in cases in-
volving a 'special relationship' between the parties. '36 It was this ex-
ception that the court found applicable in Duffin:
all negligence actions," since the losses are not "purely economic" when they are accompa-
nied by either personal injury or property damage.
31. 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975).
32. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007-08, 895 P.2d at 1200-01.
33. "Over the mountain/Down in the valley/Lives a former talk-show host/
Everybody knows his name/He says there's no doubt about it/It was the myth of finger-
prints/I've seen them all and man/they're all the same." PAUL SIMON, All Around the
World or The Myth of Fingerprints, on GRACELAND (Warner Brothers Records 1986).
34. Just's simply states the same enigmatic "unique circumstances requiring a
different allocation of risk" exception, Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462,
470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978), and in turn cites Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558
(9th Cir. 1974).
35. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
36. Id.
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ICIA has held itself out as having expertise in the perform-
ance of a specialized function [and] . . . it has engaged in a
marketing campaign . . . the very purpose of which is to in-
duce reliance by purchasers on the fact that seed has been
certified. Under such circumstances, ICIA occupies a special
relationship with those whose reliance it has knowingly in-
duced. 7
This relationship between ICIA and the Duffins imposed a tort duty
on ICIA to take care to protect the Duffins from economic loss. The
court, therefore, reversed the grant of summary judgment and re-
manded for further proceedings.
The Duffins also brought a claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion. The district court granted defendants a summary judgment on
this claim; the supreme court affirmed summarily: "we expressly hold
that, except in the narrow confines of a professional relationship in-
volving an accountant, the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not
recognized in Idaho."'
The Idaho Supreme Court used Duffin to summarize the case
law on recovery for economic loss in tort. In the court's analysis, al-
though economic loss may be recovered when a plaintiff has also suf-
fered either personal injury or property damage, it generally may not
be recovered when it is the only loss suffered. Such losses - "Pure"
economic losses - may be recovered in tort in only two situations:
when there is an undefined "unique circumstance" that requires a dif-
ferent allocation of the risk and when there is a "special relationship"
between the parties. Finally, the court independently discussed and
sharply limited the possible reach of the tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation.
The court's decision in Duffin offers an accessible overview of the
legal issues presented by economic loss. The court's preliminary map
of the borderlands between contract-based and tort-based claims is,
however, markedly incomplete. Rather than the relatively well-
defined domains it presents, the borderlands are a contested region of
indistinct and shifting frontiers. To understand this terrain, it is help-
37. Id. In addition, the court concluded that a second defendant - the Federal-
State Inspection Service - had done nothing "actively... to induce reliance" and there-
fore did not have a special relationship with the purchasers of certified seed. Id.
38. Id. at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203. The decision to which the court implicitly re-
fers is Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989).
Idaho Bank & Trust held that an accountant can be held liable for negligent misrepresen-
tation under specific circumstances. Id. at 1083, 772 P.2d at 721. Although the court's
statement in Duffin is absolute, the extent to which the prohibition applies to claims for
personal irjury or property damage, the language is dicta.
19981
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ful to begin with an examination of the question of what counts as
"economic loss."
III. UNCERTAINTY AT THE BORDER OF ECONOMIC LOSS
AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
Tort damages come in three varieties: personal injury, property
damage, and economic loss. In most cases, the classification of losses
presents no conceptual difficulties: the driver of a delivery truck runs
a stop sign and hits a car (property damage), injuring its driver (per-
sonal injuries), and causing the driver to miss work while recuperat-
ing (economic loss); a passenger in the car - although not injured -
misses an important meeting and loses a sale (economic loss). In such
cases, "economic loss" presents no definitional issues: lost wages, lost
profits, and the like are all "economic."
Although the distinction between personal injury and other
losses is clear - both factually and ethically39 - the line between
property damage and economic loss is more problematic because the
two types of loss may overlap - sometimes substantially. The most
significant area of overlap involves injury to a product. For example,
if the delivery truck had been damaged in a single-vehicle accident
caused by the failure of its own brakes, is the damage "property dam-
age" or "economic loss" in a suit against the product seller? In other
words: does the existence of a contract between the parties affect the
characterization of the type of loss? If the delivery truck had been a
car would the claim be for property damage? That is: does the fact
that the property is held to produce income rather than for personal
use, affect the characterization of the type of loss? What is the justifi-
cation if such external factors affect the characterization of the type of
loss?
As the court noted in Duffin,4° the distinction between economic
loss and property damage was given its present contours in Idaho in
Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.4 The
case was brought by the purchaser of an airplane to recover for exten-
sive damages to the plane caused by engine failure during takeoff.
Differing statutes of limitations required the court to distinguish be-
tween tort and contract actions - which in turn led the court to dis-
39. Cf Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho
348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975) ("A plaintiff can seek recovery of damages ... for per-
sonal injury, property damage, and economic loss. Although personal injuries stand dis-
tinctly apart from the other two categories, a delineation between the latter two is neces-
sary.").
40. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1199.
41. 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975).
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tinguish between personal injuries, property damage, and economic
loss:
Although personal injuries stand distinctly apart from the
other two categories, a delineation between the latter two is
necessary. Property damage encompasses damage to property
other than that which is the subject of the transaction. Eco-
nomic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defec-
tive property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as
commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of
profits or use.4
2
The court in Salmon Rivers thus drew the line between property
damage and economic loss based on the identity of the property: if the
property that is damaged is the subject of the transaction - the de-
livery truck that crashes due to brake failure - the loss is "economic."
The airplane engine that failed causing the craft to crash in Salmon
Rivers thus was economic loss. 43 Similarly, a tractor that was under-
powered, 44 a roof coating that failed to perform, 45 and a rental unit
with substantial structural problems46 were economic losses in suits
against sellers and manufacturers of the products. It is only when
other, non-transactional property is injured that the loss is "property
damage."
Although the court enunciated a bright-line rule, its subsequent
decisions have dimmed the distinction. The court has on occasion
treated the loss of transactional property as property damage and on
others has interpreted injury to non-transactional property as eco-
nomic loss. For example, in Oppenheimer Industries v. Johnson Cattle
Co.,47 plaintiff sought to recover in negligence for the failure of a state
brand inspector to demand proof of ownership of cattle being offered
for sale. Under the State Brand Board's regulations, the inspector
was required to demand proof of ownership when the brands on the
cattle were "fresh." Despite the presence of fresh brands, the inspector
failed to demand proof of ownership - and the seller was in fact a
cattle rustler. The court allowed the negligence claim despite the fact
that the loss involved property that was the subject of the transaction.
It did so, not on the ground that the claim fell within an exception to
the general no-duty rule, but rather on the ground that the injury was
not economic loss: "Oppenheimer is not still in possession of defective
42. Id. at 351, 544 P.2d at 309.
43. Id.
44. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
45. State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984).
46. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987).
47. 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1987).
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goods. Rather, Oppenheimer has suffered the loss of its property (i.e.
the cattle) due to the negligence of the deputy brand inspector."'48
Since the loss was property damage, a negligence action was permis-
sible.
As the court in Duffin tacitly acknowledged, Oppenheimer's dis-
tinction between lost and damaged property is logically insupport-
able. 49 If a defective product entirely self-destructs - if the engine
failure had demolished the airplane in Salmon Rivers rather than
merely damaged it - would the loss thereby be transmuted into
property damage? Or would the fact that the owner still had posses-
sion of the wreckage be sufficient to prevent a claim for property
damage? If the crash had caused a loss of only ninety-five percent of
the value, would the claim therefore be one for economic loss? A dis-
tinction that turns on such fortuitous results is nonsensical.
The court has also wobbled in the opposite direction, refusing to
allow tort claims in situations where non-transactional property was
damaged. For example, in G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.,50
plaintiff purchased an irrigation system that failed to deliver the nec-
essary volume of water; plaintiff suffered reduced crop yields. The
damage thus was to non-transactional property - the growing crops
- rather than to the transactional property - the irrigation system.
Nonetheless, the court asserted that this was an economic loss and re-
fused to allow a negligence claim.
Although the G & M Farms decision is inconsistent with the
definition announced in Salmon Rivers and reaffirmed in Duffin, it is
eminently reasonable: the irrigation system was purchased in the
course of the commercial endeavor of producing crops. The plaintiff
hoped to make a profit from sale of the crop; the damages sought were
not intended to replace the damaged property, but rather to compen-
sate the company for its lost profits. The court would have exalted
form over substance if it had focused on the fact that crops were non-
transactional property and held the injury to be property damage.'
48. Id. at 426, 732 P.2d at 664. Alternatively, the court might have held that the
loss of the cattle was property damage because the category "transactional property" ap-
plies only to transactions between a buyer and a seller. Such a distinction would narrow
the term "transactional," but would do violence either to the term or to the rationale for
the definition.
49. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007 n.5, 895 P.2d at 1200 n.5.
50. 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991).
51. Counter-examples to G & M Farms are also available. For example, in
Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974), a bean farmer who
sought to recover for lost profits when he was required to recall a crop of seed beans ren-
dered unusable by a defect in a pesticide-fungicide manufactured by defendant was per-
mitted to proceed under alternative theories of strict liability in tort, negligence, and
breach of warranty. In a subsequent case, the court categorized the losses in Shields as
"property damage" - even though the loss occurred in the context of a commercial trans-
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A subsequent decision by the court of appeals offers a rationale
for decisions such as G & M Farms. In Myers v. A.O. Smith Harves-
tore Products,2 milk production at a dairy farm was reduced by prob-
lems with a feed storage and delivery system. The trial court granted
defendants' motions for summary judgment on the tort claims, con-
cluding that only economic loss was involved and that such losses
could not be recovered in a tort action. Although the court of appeals
cited the supreme court's definition of "economic loss" from Salmon
Rivers, it acknowledged that the Myers' losses did not fall within that
definition. Instead, the court recast the term: "Arguably, the Myers
did allege property damage resulting from a defective product. How-
ever, these injuries did not result from a calamitous event or danger-
ous failure of the product. Rather, they arose from the failure of the
product to match the buyers' commercial expectations."5 Disap-
pointed but not endangered purchasers are to be left to their contract
remedies. The court therefore upheld the summary judgment on the
tort claims.
The definition of pure economic loss as applied to damage to tan-
gible property thus is more complicated than the court acknowledged
in Duffin. Salmon Rivers as modified by Myers distinguishes "eco-
nomic loss" from "property damage" on the basis of two factors: first,
damage to property that is the subject of the transaction forming the
basis of the suit is economic loss - regardless of the manner in which
the loss occurred;' second, damage to other, non-transactional prop-
erty is economic loss when the damage occurs through a non-
calamitous event or a non-dangerous failure.55 Stated from the oppo-
site perspective: to be classified as property damage rather than eco-
nomic loss, the property must be both non-transactional property and
damaged as a result of a calamitous event or a dangerous failure.
The Idaho courts have been less than clear on the principles un-
derlying these definitional lines. Since tort is concerned with safety,
the prohibition of tort claims for non-calamitous losses to non-
action indistinguishable from that in G & M Farms. See Clark v. International Harvester
Co., 99 Idaho 326, 332, 581 P.2d 784, 790 (1978).
52. 114 Idaho 432, 757 P.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1988) (review denied).
53. Id. at 436, 757 P.2d at 699. The holding in Myers was prefigured in Clark
where the court quoted extensively from Presser's Handbook on the Law of Torts that a
seller might be liable in negligence for damage to the defective product where the damage
is caused by an accident but not when "there is no accident." Clark v. International Har-
vester Co., 99 Idaho at 333, 581 P.2d at 791 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 101, at 665 (4th ed. 1971)). The court in Clark did not, however, em-
phasize the point, and the issue was not presented by the facts.
54. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,
351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975).
55. Myers, 114 Idaho 432, 757 P.2d 695.
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transactional property such as those in G & M Farms and Myers is
consistent with policy underlying this body of law. Similarly, as the
court of appeals noted in Myers, contract principles are applicable to
non-calamitous losses to non-transactional property since such claims
are "for lost profits and consequential business losses" resulting from
an ineffective product.16 These are the types of losses that are appro-
priately addressed within a contract framework - a framework that
has been developed precisely to allocate business losses.5 7 The refusal
to allow claims for such losses to be brought in tort thus accords with
both fundamental tort principles - since safety was not at issue - as
well as fundamental contract principles - since the allocation of such
business losses is the raison d'etre for contract damage rules.
The absolute prohibition against recovering for damage to trans-
actional property, on the other hand, is more problematic. For exam-
ple, if plaintiff purchases an airplane that crashes, the fact that plain-
tiff is miraculously uninjured seems fortuitous - and the line pro-
hibiting a tort claim seems on it face unprincipled. Nonetheless, on
such facts the court in Salmon Rivers simply announced the distinc-
tion between transactional and non-transactional property without
any discussion of its basis.58 To the extent that the tort goal of risk re-
duction is relevant, then endangerment should be the touchstone for
potential tort liability. As the Oregon Supreme Court decided when
presented with a similar issue, "the distinction [is] between the dis-
appointed users [who are relegated to contract] and the endangered
ones [who may sue in tort]. '59
Although the line between "endangered" and "disappointed" cor-
responds to the difference between safety and quality that underlie
the respective domains of tort and contract, most courts have con-
cluded that the bright-line prohibition is a satisfactory balance of the
56. Id. at 436, 757 P.2d at 699.
57. Id.
58. See Salmon Rivers, 97 Idaho at 351, 544 P.2d at 309. Plaintiff in a subse-
quent case also involving a malfunctioning aircraft raised the issue, arguing that the eco-
nomic loss was caused by the plaintiffs refusal to use the aircraft given the "potential for
calamitous personal injury or property damage" if it again fell out of the sky. Manage-
ment Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc., 119 Idaho 626, 631, 809 P.2d 487, 492 (1991)
(Bistline, J., dissenting) (quoting Appellants Brief). The court did not reach the question.
The court has reached a similar result at other points of contact between tort and
contract. For example, in 1985 the court held that emotional distress could not be recov-
ered in an action for breach of contract; if the conduct was sufficiently outrageous, recov-
ery might be available in punitive damages. Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 699 P.2d 1371
(1985). In a subsequent decision the court refused to allow emotional distress for the neg-
ligent repair of an aircraft - even though the discovery of the problem occurred when the
plane was airborne. Hathaway v. Krumery, 110 Idaho 515, 716 P.2d 1287 (1986) (per cu-
riam).
59. Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Or. 1978) (Linde, J.).
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competing policies 0 - particularly when the efficiency advantages of
a clear rule are added to the scales.6 ' For example, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that drawing the line between economic
loss and property damage between endangered and disappointed was
'too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their
business behavior.6 2 Furthermore, the Court thought that the dis-
tinction ignored the simple fact that, regardless of the nature of the
event producing the loss, the loss 'Is essentially the failure of the pur-
chaser to receive the benefit of its bargain - traditionally the core
concern of contract law. 16 3 Contract law - particularly its warranty
provisions - offers a preferable method for allocating risks to eco-
nomic expectations, the Court concluded, because it provides tools for
limiting the scope of otherwise unpredictable economic losses.' In
short, the rule defining damage to transactional property as "eco-
nomic loss" is justified by the concern with the potentially unlimited
liability that might arise in tort.
This seems to be the position that has evolved in Idaho: Salmon
Rivers defines losses to transactional property as economic loss; Myers
adds damage to non-transactional property that occurs from a non-
calamitous event. Although there are inconsistent decisions, they are
60. This appears to be the majority rule. E.g., East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870-71 (1986); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403
P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965). There is, however, substantial diversity on the topic. See Spring
Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663 (N.J. 1985) (commercial buyer
may recover for pure economic loss only in contract); Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc.,
207 A.2d 305, 312 (N.J. 1970) (consumer may recover pure economic loss in strict liability
in tort); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d at 1387 (tort recovery for pure economic loss
permitted when the user is "endangered" rather than "disappointed'; Berg v. General
Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818, 822 (Wash. 1976) (pure economic loss may be recovered in
negligence).
61. The most frequently cited justification for rules is efficiency: by providing a
clear line between competing universes, a rule reduces the costs of litigation over the
boundary. Those whose claims fall on the contract side of the line will forebear when they
can only hope to recover in tort. The gain, of course, is purchased at some loss of equity
since a case-by-case determination produces fairer results. Contrariwise, the gains in eq-
uity are purchased at the cost of increased indeterminacy and inefficiency. See East River
Steamship, 476 U.S. at 870.
62. Id. at 870. The rationale obviously assumes the conclusion: contract rules
protect contract interests better than do tort principles.
63. Id.
64. "A warranty action also has a built-in limitation on liability, whereas a tort
action could subject the manufacturer to damages of an indefinite amount" because "fore-
seeability is an inadequate brake .... Permitting recovery to all foreseeable claims for
purely economic loss could make the manufacturer liable for vast sums." Id. at 874.
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aberrational' or poorly reasoned.6 6
However the inconsistency in the case law is to be resolved, it is
important to note that it involves a fairly narrow range of situations.
The more common examples of economic loss - such as lost profits -
are not in dispute: the problem stems solely from a sometimes uncer-
tain boundary between tort and contract when tangible property is
damaged. Furthermore, this uncertainty is most likely to be present
in only a single type of case involving economic loss: cases involving
the sale of goods. And economic loss may occur in a much more di-
verse group of cases.
IV. THE CASES: A TYPOLOGY
Although the court in Duffin spoke of "a general rule prohibiting
the recovery of purely economic losses" in tort"7 except in two situa-
tions - when "unique circumstances" or a "special relationship" are
present' - the actual typology of the cases is more complicated.
Rather than an orderly rule-with-two-exceptions, the Idaho economic-
loss cases resemble a shifting map of the Balkans with their various
factual patterns and the conflicting policies. Although it may not be
true that the no-duty rule is more honored in the breach than in the
application, it is nonetheless true that the rule is subject to a signifi-
cant number of exceptions and qualifications.
Pure economic loss cases can be divided into six categories:
1. Cases involving shoddy goods in which there is a contract between
plaintiff and defendant. Defendant contracts with plaintiff for
the sale of a product that fails to perform as expected. For ex-
ample, defendant sells plaintiff a tractor which causes plain-
tiff economic losses when he is unable to plow the desired
number of acres per hour. 9
2. Cases involving shoddy goods in which there is no contract be-
tween plaintiff and defendant. Most commonly, plaintiff con-
tracts with a third party to purchase goods; the third party in
65. For example, in a decision decided before Salmon Rivers but reaffirmed after
that decision, the court held that non-transactional property damaged in a non-
calamitous event was "property damage" rather than "economic loss." Shields v. Morton
Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99
Idaho 326, 332, 581 P.2d 784, 790 (1978) (categorizing the losses in Shields as "property
damage').
66. See Oppenheimer Indus. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423, 426, 732 P.2d
661, 664 (1987).
67. 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200.
68. Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
69. See Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
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turn contracts with defendant, who breaches the contract;
plaintiff seeks to recover against the remote manufacturer in
negligence. For example, plaintiff seeks a metal building to
house his business. He contracts with a local contractor to
erect the structure. The contractor in turn orders the building
from a fabricator. When the building turns out to be less-than-
desired, plaintiff seeks to sue the fabricator. 70
3. Cases involving the misperformance of a service contract between
defendant and plaintiff. Defendant, for example, contracts
with plaintiff to insure plaintiffs business against the risk of
fire. When the property is subsequently destroyed by fire,
plaintiff discovers that defendant had failed adequately to in-
sure the inventory.7
4. Cases involving the misperformance of a service contract between
defendant and a third party that causes economic loss to plain-
tiff. Defendant, for example, contracts with a city to redevelop
its blighted urban core and agrees both to take steps to miti-
gate potential losses to businesses in the core and to complete
the work by a specified date. A business in the redevelopment
area suffers economic losses when customers avoid shopping
at her store because of the inconvenience the construction
causes. 2 A recurrent variation on this category of cases in-
volves what are often characterized as "misrepresentations."
For example, an accountant contracts with a company to pre-
pare an opinion on the financial condition of a company. A
third party loans money based on the opinion. When the com-
pany defaults on its loans, the third party brings a negligence
action against the accountant. 73
5. Cases in which economic loss is caused by damage to a relational
interest: the breach of a tort - rather than a contract - duty
owed to a third party causes economic loss to the plaintiff For
example, defendant allows a visitor to bring a greyhound onto
fairgrounds where a horse race is being held. The dog decides
to join the race with disastrous results for a jockey whose
mount collides with the dog. The jockey's employer brings an
70. See Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341
(1984).
71. See McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976).
72. See Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978).
73. See Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720
(1989).
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action for the losses he suffers because the jockey is unable to
ride for him.7
4
6. Cases involving economic loss in which a legislative standard
creates the duty of care. Two examples suggest the diverse
range of the cases in this category. In the first, plaintiff con-
tracts with a third party to care for plaintiff's cattle. The third
party rebrands the cattle and sells them at auction. When
plaintiff discovers its loss, it brings suit against the State
Brand Board, contending that one of the Board's inspectors
had violated its regulations which require inspectors to de-
mand proof of ownership when brands were "fresh."' The sec-
ond - and far more common - example involves the Idaho
wrongful death statute: defendant, for example, runs a stop
sign and kills a spouse and father, causing economic loss to
his heirs.76
A. Shoddy Goods: Contracts Between Plaintiff and
Defendant for the Sale of Goods
Shoddy goods often cause economic loss - if only because the
purchaser fails to receive the value desired. This category of case is
the clearest situation in which the boundary between tort and con-
tract is at issue: the relationship between the parties has its origin in
contract and the losses suffered are exclusively economic. Not sur-
prisingly, this is also the situation in which the no-duty rule has its
most general application.
In Taylor v. Herbold," defendant purchased 7,000 cwt. of pota-
toes from plaintiff; he failed to take delivery as required by the con-
tract. Plaintiff brought a contract action for the potatoes purchased
but unclaimed. He also brought a second action for "tortious damages"
arising from the breach of the contract. Plaintiff sought these dam-
ages for the approximately 3,000 cwt. that remained in his cellar, con-
tending that, because other buyers in the area knew of the dispute be-
tween plaintiff and defendant, they were unwilling to purchase the
remaining 3,000 cwt. in the undivided 10,000 cwt. pile. The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's judgment n.o.v. for the defendant on
the tort claim, holding that a breach of contract does not give rise to a
tort unless the duty to act with due care arises independently of the
contract.
74. See Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910).
75. Oppenheimer Indus. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661
(1987).
76. E.g., Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944).
77. 94 Idaho 133, 483 P.2d 664 (1971).
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The court predicated its decision on a "general rule": the breach
of a contract - without more - does not give rise to a duty in tort. In
explaining its decision, the court posited two types of situations in
which "something more" would be present and a tort duty would arise
independently of the contractual relationship between the parties.
First, one of the parties might act negligently toward the other party
without regard to the contract between them: the contract, in other
words, would merely bring the parties into physical proximity."8 Sec-
ond, in at least some situations, a contract might itself give rise to a
relationship that imposes a duty of due care on one of the parties.
Such situations, the court wrote, "primarily involv[e] cases in which
one of the parties was engaged in a public calling or public transpor-
tation."' In the case before it, the court concluded neither exception
was applicable: Herbold had done nothing beyond breaching his con-
tractual duty to take delivery of the potatoes. He therefore was not li-
* able in tort.
The court reached a similar conclusion in Clark v. International
Harvester Co.," a negligence claim for a defectively designed tractor.
Plaintiff, a custom farmer, experienced recurrent difficulties in at-
taining sufficient pulling power from the tractor and he eventually
78. See id. at 138, 483 P.2d at 669 (finding an exception for "those situations in
which misfeasance rather than nonfeasance was the issue'. For example, the court of ap-
peals has held that a defendant who had contracted to install a water heater could be li-
able in negligence if the water heater lacked a pressure relief valve:
Negligence in the sense of nonperformance of a contract will not sustain
an action sounding in tort, in the absence of a liability imposed by law inde-
pendent of that arising out of the contract itself; rather, active negligence or
misfeasance is necessary to support an action in tort based upon a breach of
contract. Taylor v. Herbold .... Here Galbraith's claim does not assert non-
performance by Vangas of a contract to install a water heater. The water
heater was, in fact, installed. Rather, the complaint, in substance, alleges
misfeasance by Vangas in installing a water heater which lacked a pressure
relief valve.
... The contract for sale and installation of a water heater (complete
with a pressure relief device) established the relationship, and certain obliga-
tions, between the parties. But each of them also brought into this relation-
ship a more general duty. This is the duty that "one owes ... to every person
in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any
situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure
to use such care might result in such injury."
Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 914, 655 P.2d 119, 121 (Ct. App. 1982) (quoting
Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980) (quoting Kirby v.
Sonville, 594 P.2d 818, 821 (Or. 1979))). Because the Taylor court does not emphasize the
fact that the loss was solely economic, it does not note that its first exception will rarely, if
ever, produce exclusively economic loss.
79. Taylor, 94 Idaho at 138, 483 P.2d at 669.
80. 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
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brought suit, seeking to recover for lost profits due to "down time" and
for the costs of repairing and replacing allegedly defective parts. The
court reversed a judgment for plaintiff, holding that such pure eco-
nomic losses could not be recovered in a tort action. The issue, the
court stated, was
the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must under-
take in distributing his products. He can appropriately be
held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring
his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of
conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot
be held for the level of performance of his products in the con-
sumer's business unless he agrees that the product was de-
signed to meet the consumer's demands. A consumer should
not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing
the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the
market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that
the product will not match his economic expectations unless
the manufacturer agrees it will.81
The conjunction of Taylor and Clark creates a broad prohibition
against tort 2 recovery of pure economic losses arising from the breach
of a contract between plaintiff and defendant for the sale of goods. It
is a rule that the court has almost consistently followed. The court
has held that a negligence claim for shoddily constructed rental
housing units did not state a cause of action because plaintiff suffered
only economic loss,8 3 that a plaintiff could not rely upon negligence in
seeking to recover for the construction of a prefabricated building
when the negligence caused neither personal injury nor property
81. Id. at 334, 581 P.2d at 792 (quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145,
151 (Cal. 1965)).
82. Although Clark was a negligence action, the court's discussion focused more
broadly on "tort" actions including strict liability in tort claims. See id. at 333-36, 581 P.2d
791-94. The case has subsequently been cited as deciding that "economic loss ... will not
support a tort action in either negligence or strict liability." State v. Mitchell Constr. Co.,
108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1984). The issue appears never to have been ar-
gued. This ambiguity may account for the Duffin court's seeming vacillation on the scope
of the general rule. Although the court states that there is "a general rule prohibiting re-
covery of purely economic losses in all negligence actions," it also writes that there are ex-
ceptions which allow recovery of such losses "in tort" under some circumstances. Duffin,
126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200 (emphasis added).The prohibition includes only non-intentional torts. Pure economic losses can be re-
covered in fraud, an intentional tort that is located on the fuzzy tort-contract boundary.
See, e.g., Zuhlke v. Anderson Buick, Inc., 94 Idaho 634, 496 P.2d 95 (1972); Edmark Mo-
tors, Inc. v. Twin Cities Toyota, Inc., 111 Idaho 846, 727 P.2d 1274 (Ct. App. 1987).
83. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40-41, 740 P.2d 1022, 1025-26 (1987).
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damage," that an irrigation system which failed to provide sufficient
water volume because of an allegedly negligent design was not ac-
tionable in tort," and that the cost of repairing or replacing an alleg-
edly defective roof on a new building could not be recovered in either
negligence or strict liability."
B. Shoddy Goods: Contracts for the Sale of Goods in Which There
is No Privity Between Plaintiff and Defendant
The court has reached the same no-duty conclusion when the
purchaser of goods sues a remote manufacturer alleging pure eco-
nomic loss. Given the length of the distribution chain for most prod-
ucts, this category of cases is a common one. Purchasers are unlikely
to be in privity of contract with the actual manufacturer or assembler
of a product. For example, Ronald Corrado contracted with Adkison
Corporation for the construction of a building to house his aircraft
mechanic business."7 Adkison in turn contracted with Rural Systems,
Inc. (RSI) the dealer for American Building Company (ABC) to pro-
vide a built-to-order metal building. In placing the order with ABC,
RSI made a mistake. The building as delivered also had additional
problems. Corrado and Adkison sued ABC in both contract and tort
for the economic losses they suffered.
The court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant on the
tort claims. Holding that 'the law of contract should control actions
for purely economic loss and not the law of torts," the court concluded
that "actions for purely economic losses must be viewed in a contract
setting with relevant contract principles.""
C. Poor Service: Contracts Between Plaintiff and Defendant
Just as shoddy products can cause economic loss, so can poor
service. Furthermore, service contracts present factual patterns that
are superficially very similar to those in the sale of shoddy goods:
plaintiff and defendant have a contract; defendant breaches the con-
tract; plaintiff seeks to recover not (or not only) in contract but (also)
in tort. Again, this is a situation in which the boundary between tort
84. Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 411, 690 P.2d 341, 346
(1984).
85. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 527, 808 P.2d 851, 864
(1991).
86. State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 1349, 1350
(1984).
87. See Adkison, 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341.
88. Id. at 410, 410-11, 690 P.2d at 345, 345-46.
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and contract is at issue: the relationship between the parties has its
origin in contract and the losses suffered are exclusively economic.
Despite the seeming similarities, the differences between sales
and service contracts are more significant. Most fundamentally, the
difference between the sale/purchase of a product and the
sale/purchase of a service is the difference between the mass-produced
and the personal."5 The purchaser of a product seldom obtains it di-
rectly from the manufacturer; the purchaser of a service, on the other
hand, is quite likely to deal directly with the provider. While the per-
sonal element in service contracts is declining with the rise of the
service economy - and a concomitant increasing scale of service pro-
viders that is approaching something akin to mass-production -
nonetheless, service contracts remain more personal and idiosyn-
cratic: even taking a mass-produced VCR into the franchised war-
ranty service provider requires a level of personal interaction that the
purchaser of a product seldom has with its manufacturer.
These differences - as imprecise as they are - appear to lie at
the core of the court's differing treatment of sales and service con-
tracts - a difference that the court has often stated as a conclusion
that service contracts can form the basis for a relationship between
the parties that is sufficiently "special" to give rise to a tort duty to
act with care in providing the service.90 Thus, for example, the court
89. The change from hand-made to mass-produced with its resulting deperson-
alization of the contract for the purchase of products was one rationale for changing the
law of products liability from contract to tort. Contract allowed the producer to avoid re-
sponsibility for the danger it built into a product by avoiding any contact with the actual
purchaser/user. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Co., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)
(Traynor, J.); Escola v. Coca Cola, 150 P.2d 436, 440, 443-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053-54 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo,
J.).
90. "Special relationships" as a source of the duty of care are not limited to cases
involving economic loss. To understand the role of such special relationships in tort, it is
helpful to note briefly the bigger picture. Duty in negligence can be conceived as falling
into four broad categories:
(1) a general duty to act with care when the actor creates a risk: when an individual
acts in a manner that imposes a foreseeable risk of harm on others, the actor generally
has a duty to act with due care to minimize the risk. E.g., Wilson v. Boise City, 6 Idaho
391, 55 P. 887 (1899).
(2) a general no-duty when the individual does not create the risk: when the indi-
vidual did not create the risk, she generally does not have a duty to act either to minimize
the risk or to protect individuals subject to it. E.g., Fagundes v. State, 116 Idaho 173, 774
P.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1989). The distinction is often characterized as the difference between
misfeasance - which subjects the actor to a duty to act with care - and nonfeasance -
which does not give rise to a duty to act to protect. The distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance can be paper thin. See, e.g., Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d
500 (9th Cir. 1975); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980).
(3) exceptions to the no-duty-to-act rule: in some situations, the court has been
willing to impose a duty to act when the individual did not herself create the risk. For ex-
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has held that agreements to send a telegraph message,91 to insure
plaintiffs business,92 or to repair his truck"3 are special relationships
that do not to fall within the no-duty-in-tort rule. Such situations are
distinguishable from situations involving the sale of goods, the court
has stated, because the sale of goods does "not involve the rendering
of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and experi-
ence.
'*
ample, when the individual assumes a duty, e.g., Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho
297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990); Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1931), or there is a spe-
cial relationship between defendant and plaintiff, e.g., S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95
Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973); Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954), or be-
tween defendant and a third party whose conduct is the source of the risk, e.g., Davis v.
Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1931), the court has imposed duties to protect others from
harm.
(4) limited duty situations are situations in which the court has been unwilling to
apply the general duty-to-act-with-care standard to activities that cause certain types of
injuries. The paradigm example is emotional distress: concern with unlimited liability and
potentially fraudulent claims has led the court to fashion duty rules that stop far short of
the traditional "foreseeability limitations on tort liability. See, e.g., Brown v. Matthews
Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37 (1990); Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640 (1989). Economic loss falls into this category.
In addition to the broad similarities among the different types of limited duty situa-
tions, there are also similarities between the types of factual patterns and policies that
will lead to the creation of a duty-to-act under the third category and the patterns and
policies that will lead to more expansive liability for the limited duty interests in the
fourth category. The most striking of these is the "special relationship" category: the court
has been willing to impose a duty-to-act when there is a sufficient relationship between
either plaintiff and defendant, e.g., Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d
506 (1990) (landlord/tenant's employee); Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 331, 116 Idaho
586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989) (school/student); Merritt v. State, 108 Idaho 20, 696 P.2d 871
(1985) (jailer/jailed); Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 500 P.2d 218 (1972)
(quasi-common carrier/passenger); Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954)
(common carrier/passenger); McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17
Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909) (race promoter~ockey), or between defendant and the third
party who has created the risk, e.g., Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135
(1980) (bartender/consumer); Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1931) (doc-
tor/nurse). These "special relationships" are conceptually indistinguishable from the "spe-
cial relationships" involved in the pure economic loss cases. One recurrent source of "spe-
cial relationships" in the duty-to-act context are service contracts. See, e.g., S.H. Kress &
Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973) (boiler repairer had a duty to inspect
the external safety devices on boiler and thus was potentially liable for boiler explosion
not caused by the repairer's work); Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954)
(common carrier had a duty to protect passengers from risk of alternative transportation
after bus broke down).
91. Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910).
92. McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976).
93. Dick v. Reese, 90 Idaho 447, 412 P.2d 815 (1966).
94. McAlvain, 97 Idaho at 780, 554 P.2d at 958; see also Duffin, 126 Idaho at
1008, 895 P.2d at 1120. Although the court did not note it, the law applicable to the sale of
products does offer an analogue to the factual patterns that characterize "special relation-
ships" - and the Uniform Commercial Code has provided an implied warranty that re-
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In Duffin, the court stated its intention 'to define the parame-
ters" of the '"special relationship' exception." 5 The term, it wrote, "re-
fers to those situations where the relationship between the parties is
such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty.""6 Unfortu-
nately, this definition is singularly unhelpful because the key term -
"equitable" - provides so little guidance. Although the court does
supplement its definition with an examination of case law, it looks at
a single case - McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of America.97 As a
result, the court's analysis is incomplete and potentially misleading."
In part, the analytical problems with the opinion may be traceable to
the fact that duty questions arise episodically and piecemeal in the
process of deciding cases; to define the category thoroughly requires
an analysis of a large number of cases that are not easily collected.9
In part, the problem is also due to the court's narrow focus on the re-
lationship question as a subset of the economic loss issue rather than
as a recurrent source of a duty of care.
Whatever the source of the problem, the court's definition is dou-
bly under-inclusive. First, it failed to note that "special relationship"
is a source of duty applicable to more than just economic loss cases: a
special relationship, for example, is an exception to the nonfea-
sance/misfeasance divide in negligence. That is, a special relationship
may be the source of a duty to protect someone from a risk not of the
duty-bound person's making. 00 The court's analysis thus does not in-
clude the full range of special-relationship cases. Second, the exis-
tence of a special relationship is not the sole source of exceptions to
the no-duty-to-prevent-economic-loss-in-tort rule. Other factors -
such as the status of the defendant'0' - may give rise to a duty to
take care to prevent economic loss. Although the court stated that it
flects such relationships. The Code provides that, when a purchaser informs the seller of
the purchaser's particular needs and the seller makes a recommendation upon which the
purchaser relies, the seller has impliedly warranted the product to be fit for the pur-
chaser's particular purposes. IDAHO CODE § 28-2-315 (1995).
95. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
96. Id.
97. 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976).
98. The court did not canvas the many decisions that have recognized relation-
ships as sufficiently "special" to create a duty in negligence. Thus, it did not fully articu-
late the factors required to denominate a relationship as "special."
99. Cases involving special relationships are difficult to collect because they fall
through the cracks in both the older digesting system and the newer computerized sys-
tems: the digests do not have a category for "special relationship" and not all cases that
involve the issue employ the terminology.
100. See, e.g., S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973).
101. E.g., Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910).
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was canvassing the topic,"°2 it in fact omitted a number of cases and
categories that should be included in any complete summary.
1. The Status of the Service Provider as a Source of Duty
One of the earliest sources of duty in tort involved the so-called
"public callings." At the common law, common carriers, innkeepers,
and the like had tort duties of due care imposed on them beyond any
duties they may have assumed in contract.0 3 It thus is not surprising
that businesses which fit within the category - or which are suffi-
ciently analogous to it'04 - are also subject to liability for pure eco-
nomic loss in tort.'
0 5
For example, in Strong v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 0 6 plain-
tiff brought an action for damages caused by a telegraph message that
had inadvertently misquoted the price of cattle being bought and sold.
Although the contract between the telegraph company and the sender
expressly stated that the company would not be liable for the results
of a mistransmission and offered the sender the opportunity to have
the message verified for an additional charge, the court set aside the
contractual limitation on the ground that public policy precluded de-
fendant from contracting away liability for its own negligence. 0 7 In
reaching this decision, the court emphasized the quasi-public nature
of the company as evidenced by its charter:
While [the telegraph company] may make rules and regula-
tions in regard to the conduct of its business, the reasonable-
ness or unreasonableness of such rules must be determined
with reference to public policy, precisely as in the case of
common carriers. Public policy is that principle of law under
which freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by
102. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200.
103. See generally Norman F. Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Call-
ings, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (1927).
104. See Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 500 P.2d 218 (1972) (a pri-
vate bus line that acted like a common carrier would be treated as a common carrier).
105. Public callings are exceptions to several doctrines. For example, the court
has imposed liability on public callings in situations that would otherwise be character-
ized as nonfeasance. See, e.g., Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954); Rosen-
dahl v. Lemhi Valley Bank, 43 Idaho 273, 251 P. 293 (1926); see also David S. Bogen, The
Innkeeper's Tale: The Legal Development of a Public Calling, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 51, 51-53
(discussing theories on basis of public callings and the extension of the category into other
legal areas); Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive
Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2043-44 (1987)
(exception to exclusion of punitive damages).
106. 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. 910 (1910).
107. Cf Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984) (state-licensed
outfitter could contractually limit liability for its own negligence).
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law for the good of the community - the public good. A
stipulation in a contract which exempts the corporation from
damages for its own negligence is void when applied to a tele-
graph company as well as when applied to a common car-
rier.1
08
Having concluded that the company was precluded from disclaiming
liability, the court invoked traditional tort principles: transmission of
messages - particularly transmissions involving commercial transac-
tions - involved a foreseeable risk of harm and thus a duty to act
with care. 10 9
Similarly, in Lane v. Oregon Short Line Railroad"° plaintiff was
able to sue in tort for the loss of lambs shipped over the defendant's
line - despite the fact that the contract with the carrier provided
that the shipper would, "at his own risk and expense, load, unload,
care for, feed and water the stock until delivery.""' En route to their
destination, the lambs were unloaded for feeding into pens defendant
provided. Plaintiff left the lambs unattended overnight in the pens.
When he returned the following morning, thirty-eight lambs were
missing. Although the court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, it
did so on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to prove that defendant
was negligent rather than on the grounds that plaintiff could not re-
cover for pure economic loss in tort:
It is the duty of a carrier transporting livestock to furnish
reasonable and proper facilities and opportunities for feeding,
watering and resting them....
It is claimed that the failure to provide the gates with
patented locks was negligence. No inference of negligence can
be drawn from such failure, unless there was a showing of
such circumstances that a prudent person would have pro-
vided locks, as, for example, that others in the community
locked their pens and corrals in which livestock was kept at
night, or that sheep or other livestock had escaped from the
pens previously, or that it was customary for railroad stock-
yards to be provided with locks."'
Such public calling cases emphasize the nature of one type of
"special relationship." As the court in Strong noted, these cases share
a common core: one individual is required to surrender control over a
108. Strong, 18 Idaho at 400-01, 109 P. at 913 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 402, 109 P. at 914.
110. 34 Idaho 37, 198 P. 671 (1921).
111. Id. at 39, 198 P. at 671.
112. Id. at 40, 198 P. at 671.
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risk to another person who therefore assumes responsibility for pro-
tecting the first individual -
the public are compelled to rely absolutely on the care and
diligence of the company in the transmission of messages, and
by reason of those powers and the relation it sustains to
the public, it is obligated to perform the duties it is chartered
to perform with the care, skill and diligence [of] a prudent
man .... 113
When a traveler checks into an inn and deposits his weapons (think
broad swords and six shooters'14 ) with the innkeeper, the traveler be-
comes dependent for his personal safety on the care of the inn-
keeper. 1 5 When a traveler books passage on a common carrier, the
traveler is forced to rely upon the skill of the carrier."' When an indi-
vidual stores property in a warehouse, that person gives up her power
to protect the property and the warehouseman becomes responsible
for their safe storage."7
The relationship has extended beyond the traditional common
law public callings. Thus, when an individual leases personal prop-
erty such as a barge,"8 a truck,"' cattle,2 ' or sheep 2' to another, the
lessee has a duty to act with due care to return the property in rea-
sonable condition to the lessor. In each of the cases, one person gives
up the power to protect himself or his property against risk and nec-
essarily relies upon another person to guard against that risk. The
courts have responded to such control/dependence relationships by
imposing a duty of care.
2. Service Providers with Special Knowledge, Judgment, or Skill
A closely related category of special relationships involve profes-
sionals and others with special knowledge, judgment, or skill. Histori-
113. Strong, 18 Idaho at 404, 109 P. at 915 (emphasis added).
114. As one commentary on public callings has noted: "Frequently in defining
rules of law we must delve deeply into the past to find the reason for the rule of conduct or
liability." Arterburn, supra note 103, at 411.
115. Although "[an inn is a refuge from the perilous world outside," the duties
imposed on innkeepers flowed from the fact that the "[d]angers outside the inn were less
significant than the dangers within." Bogen, supra note 105, at 91.
116. See, e.g., Clark v. Tarr, 75 Idaho 251, 270 P.2d 1016 (1954).
117. E.g., Shockley v. Tennyson Transfer & Storage, Inc., 76 Idaho 131, 278 P.2d
795 (1955). Cf Rosendahl v. Lemhi Valley Bank, 43 Idaho 273, 251 P. 293 (1926) (plaintiff
stored bonds in a safe deposit box that was robbed).
118. Carscallen v. Lakeside Highway Dist., 44 Idaho 724, 260 P. 162 (1927).
119. Ford v. Transport Holding Corp., 96 Idaho 388, 529 P.2d 784 (1974).
120. Glover v. Spraker, 50 Idaho 16, 292 P. 613 (1930).
121. Cluer v. Leahy, 44 Idaho 320, 256 P. 760 (1927).
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cally, the public-calling category and the specialized-service-providers
category were nearly synonymous. One early English legal treatise,
for example, stated that
if a Smith prick my horse with a nail, &c. I shall have my ac-
tion of the Case against him, without any warranty by the
smith to do it well .... For it is the duty of every Artificer to
exercise his art right, &c. truly as he ought.
22
As Strong demonstrates, however, the rationales invoked in the pub-
lic calling cases - the public nature of the businesses and the con-
trol/dependence nature of the relationship - have diverged from
those applicable to service providers who possess special knowledge,
judgment, or skill. While Strong emphasized the "public utility na-
ture" of the telegraph, the leading Idaho case on the liability of service
providers emphasized the special expertise of the defendant and the
resulting reliance of the plaintiff.
a. Professional Service Providers
In McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of America,'2 3 plaintiff pur-
chased a business through defendant, a real estate agent who also
sold insurance. The agent handled both the sale and the plaintiffs
subsequent insurance requirements. Plaintiff requested sufficient in-
surance to cover the business and its inventory fully. The agent, how-
ever, insured the business for less than the full amount - a fact that
the owner discovered after the business burned. The court rejected
the defendant's argument that it had only contractual duties to the
plaintiff:
A person in the business of selling insurance holds him-
self out to the public as being experienced and knowledgeable
in this complicated and specialized field. The interest of the
state that competent persons become insurance agents is
demonstrated by the requirement that they be licensed by the
state, pass an examination administered by the state, and
meet certain qualifications. An insurance agent performs a
personal service for his client, in advising him about the kinds
and extent of desired coverage and in choosing the appropri-
ate insurance contract for the insured. Ordinarily, an insured
will look to his insurance agent, relying, not unreasonably, on
his expertise in placing his insurance problems in the agent's
122. ANTHONY FITz-HERBERT, THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM § 94d, at 225 (London:
corrected & rev'd ed. 1666).
123. 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976).
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hands. When an insurance agent performs his services negli-
gently, to the insured's injury, he should be held liable for
that negligence just as would an attorney, architect, engineer,
physician or any other professional who negligently performs
personal services.""
These factors - the expertise of the agent, the reliance of the client,
and the personal relationship between them - the court asserted,
distinguished the plaintiffs claim in McAlvain from that in Taylor
which involved only the sale of potatoes and thus did not involve 'the
rendering of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and
experience" present in McAlvain.'25 As the court in Duffin stated, in
McAlvain the court "emphasized the fact that an insurance agent
holds himself out to the public as having expertise regarding a spe-
cialized function, and that, by so doing, the agent induces reliance on
his superior knowledge and skill."'26
This rationale is generally applicable to professionals and the
court has consistently applied tort standards of liability to a broad
range of professionals - accountants,'2 7 architects,'
28 attorneys,129
surveyors,130 notary publics,'2 ' and title companies 3 2 - despite the
contractual source of the relationship between the parties and the fact
that the loss is purely economic.
In such cases, the contract forms the basis of the relationship. As
a result, the scope of the obligation assumed under the contract or the
conduct of the parties pursuant to the agreement is potentially rele-
124. Id. at 780, 554 P.2d at 958 (citations omitted); see also Bales v. General Ins.
Co. of Am., 53 Idaho 327, 24 P.2d 57 (1933) (insurance company was liable in negligence
when its agent failed to renew an insurance policy on plaintiffs oats); Wallace v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174 P. 1009 (1918) (insurance company was liable in negli-
gence when its agent failed to write an insurance policy on plaintiffs drugstore).
125. McAlvain, 97 Idaho at 780, 554 P.2d at 958.
126. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1120.
127. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986); Streib v. Veigel,
109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985); Owyhee County v. Rite, 100 Idaho 91, 593 P.2d 995
(1979).
128. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341
(1982).
129. E.g., Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 838 P.2d 293 (1992); Fitzgerald v.
Walker, 113 Idaho 730, 747 P.2d 752 (1987), following remand, 121 Idaho 589, 826 P.2d
1301 (1992); Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 813 P.2d 350 (1991); Zumwalt v. Stephan,
Balleism & Slavin, 113. Idaho 822, 748 P.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1987).
130. Williams v. Blakely, 114 Idaho 323, 757 P.2d 186 (1988).
131. Osborn v. Ahrens, 116 Idaho 14, 773 P.2d 282 (1989).
132. Merrill v. Fremont Abstract Co., 39 Idaho 238, 227 P. 34 (1924); Hillock v.
Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 P. 612 (1912). Cf. Anderson v. Title Ins. Co.,
103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82 (1982) (where defendant undertook to insure plaintiffs' title
and did not undertake to abstract that title, it was liable in contract for the amount of the
policy and was not liable in tort).
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vant to a determination of whether the defendant breached the im-
posed duty in tort. For example, when the litigation involves situa-
tions in which defendant has not acted - situations that have tradi-
tionally been labeled "nonfeasance" - questions of the existence of an
agreement are potentially relevant. In Bales v. General Insurance Co.
of America,'33 the agent for the insurance company agreed to renew an
insurance policy on plaintiffs oats that were located in a warehouse.
When the warehouse burned, it was discovered that the agent had
failed to renew the policy. Noting that liability was predicated on "the
negligence of [defendant's] agent whereby he failed to execute an
agreement to renew a policy of insurance,'1 34 the court evaluated and
rejected a series of contract defenses - lack of mutuality and indefi-
niteness of terms - before concluding:
Again we call attention that this is not an action on a
contract of insurance, but is an action for damages growing
out of the breach of a duty which [defendant] owed [plaintiff]
to renew the insurance on his oats.
... The failure to perform [this duty] in this case caused
[plaintiff] to be without the protection of a policy of insurance
when his oats were destroyed, and rendered [defendant] liable
for his resulting damage. 3
5
In the absence of a contract, defendant had no duty to do something
for the plaintiff and, in the absence of an obligation to act, would not
have breached a tort duty owed to plaintiff.3 '
More commonly, the plaintiff and defendant will have engaged in
conduct that will both provide evidence of the existence of a promis-
sory relationship and surmount the misfeasance/nonfeasance dichot-
omy. For example, in a case involving an attorney who contacted a
former client about a potential investment and who then provided the
requisite legal advice for the deal, plaintiff argued that the attorney
had assumed a duty to exercise care to protect his interests - even
though there was no formal relationship between the parties. The
133. 53 Idaho 327, 24 P.2d 57 (1933).
134. Id. at 330, 24 P.2d at 57.
135. Id. at 335, 337, 24 P.2d at 59, 60.
136. The misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy recurs in cases such as Taylor v.
Herbold where defendant agreed to purchase plaintiffs potatoes and then failed to remove
them from the cellar. The court rejected tort liability in part because "active negligence or
misfeasance is necessary to support an action in tort based on a breach of contract; mere
nonfeasance . .. is not sufficient." Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho at 138, 483 P.2d at 669
(quoting 1 C.J.S. Actions § 49(c) (1955)). The existence of a "special relationship" thus
overcomes the nonfeasance by obligating the duty-bound person to act.
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court agreed that the facts could be so understood, noting that a letter
from the client to the attorney "can be viewed as an offer for Runft
[the attorney] to enter a unilateral contract. Although the breach of
an assumed duty claim sounds in tort, evidence to support the exis-
tence of an assumed duty can be contractual in nature."'37 Thus the
letter and the attorney's subsequent actions were sufficient to create
a triable issue on whether the attorney had assumed a duty to protect
plaintiff from his subsequent economic losses in the business deal.
Not all white-collar or professional services give rise to special
relationships. For example, in Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v.
Idaho First National Bank,3 1 plaintiff sought loans from the bank to
expand and remodel its business. Following protracted negotiations,
the bank refused to make the loans plaintiff sought. Plaintiff re-
sponded by filing suit alleging that defendant had made an oral con-
tract to loan the funds and that it had also breached several tort du-
ties. After concluding that there was no contract, the court turned to
plaintiffs tort claims which were partially predicated upon the argu-
ment that the relationship between the bank and a customer was
analogous to that between an insurer and an insured. The court dis-
agreed. The relationship between a bank and its customers was not a
special relationship because it lacked the "personal" and "non-
commercial" nature that characterized the relationship. between in-
surer and insured; "[r]ather, the transaction here was a commercial
one, which would have created a debtor-creditor relationship.' 39 The
lack of the "personal" element was fatal to the claim.
Just as not all professional relationships are special, so all spe-
cial relationships are not professional: as the court in Duffin recog-
nized,4 0 the McAlvain rationale has also been applied beyond the tra-
ditional bounds of what can be categorized as "professional" occupa-
tions. The extension of the duty of care beyond public callings and
professionals has, however, proved more problematic.
137. Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 612,
873 P.2d 861, 866 (1994).
138. 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900 (1991).
139. Id. at 176, 804 P.2d at 905. The court has reiterated this conclusion on sev-
eral occasions. E.g., Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 848 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1992), (re-
view denied (1993)); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824
P.2d 841 (1991).
140. "Although McAlvain dealt with the existence of a professional or quasi-
professional relationship, we do not limit the 'special relations' exception exclusively to
such cases." Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
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b. Non-Professional Service Providers
The court's handling of cases involving non-professional service
providers has not been entirely consistent. Two lines of decisions re-
veal the contours of the problem.
The first series of cases involve disputes that result from con-
tracts to drill wells or install machinery or repair equipment. For ex-
ample, Knoblock v. Arenguena1' was a dispute that arose out of an
oral agreement to drill a well. After plaintiff completed the well, de-
fendant refused to pay contending that the hole was not sufficiently
straight to accommodate a pump. The court began with the proposi-
tion that defendant's agreement to drill the well "carried with it an
implied obligation to do the work in a good and workmanlike manner"
because
[a]ccompanying every contract is a common-law duty to per-
form with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and faithfulness
the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe
any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the con-
tract. 142
After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that the trial court's
finding that 'the well was not such a well as would be drilled in a
good and workmanlike manner so as to fulfill the purpose for which it
was intended" was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed
the judgment for plaintiff. 141
Similarly, in Dick v. Reese, 44 the court imposed a negligence
standard onto a contract for the repair of a truck. The law, the court
held, 'Implies a contract that the work shall be done with due care
and competent skill.' 45 Thus, the "garageman must exercise ordinary
care and skill in making the repairs. 1" 6 The court has reached a
similar conclusion in other cases.147
141. 85 Idaho 503, 380 P.2d 898 (1963).
142. Id. at 507-08, 380 P.2d at 901 (emphasis added) (quoting 38 AM. JUR. Negli-
gence § 20 at 662 (1954)).
143. Id. at 505, 380 P.2d at 899.
144. 90 Idaho 447, 412 P.2d 815 (1966).
145. Id. at 451, 412 P.2d at 817 (quoting 8 AM JUR. 2D Bailments § 220 (1963)).
146. Id. at 452, 412 P.2d at 817 (citations omitted); see also Beare v. Stowes'
Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 317, 658 P.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1983).
147. See, e.g., Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 690-91, 682 P.2d 640,
643-44 (1984) (action seeking to recover for dropping a pump back into a well when defen-
dant was seeking to remove the pump for repairs sounded in tort rather than contract).
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On the other hand, the court has on occasion adopted an ex-
tremely formalistic approach. " 8 For example, in Steiner Corp. v.
American District Telegraph,'49 defendant installed a fire alarm sys-
tem in plaintiff's business and contracted to maintain the system, in-
cluding monthly inspections. When the building caught fire, the
alarm system failed. Defendant, it was subsequently determined, had
not checked the system for eight months prior to the fire. Plaintiffs
argument that defendant was liable for negligently rendering a serv-
ice was rejected by the court on the ground that defendant's conduct
was "nonfeasance":
The actions alleged to have caused damage to Steiner were
clearly acts of omission or nonfeasance, as opposed to active
negligence or misfeasance. Steiner alleges that ADT failed to
properly perform its duty to inspect and maintain the fire
alarm system. Thus, a clear duty must be shown to exist by
operation of law, separate and apart from the contractual
duty to maintain the equipment. It is clear from the allega-
tions in this complaint that such a separate duty cannot be
shown. Apart from this contract, ADT could not be said to
have a duty to maintain equipment in Steiner Corporation's
building. Steiner has not pointed to any statutory duty of
suppliers of fire alarm systems, nor pointed to any common
law duty of a supplier to his customer. The only duty to which
ADT could be held under the facts of this case is that which
arose by virtue of the contract obligating it to maintain this
fire alarm system.150
The difficulty with this approach is its artificiality. Consider, for
example, this parallel restatement of Knoblock: Arenguena's allega-
tions that Knoblock failed to properly perform his duty to drill the
well must fail in the absence of a clear duty, shown to exist by opera-
tion of law, separate and apart from the contractual duty to drill the
well. But apart from his contract to drill the well, Knoblock had no
duty to do so.
The duty that the court found in Knoblock v. Arenguena - a
duty to drill with due care - is no less a conclusory statement than
the opposite conclusion reached in Steiner Corp. v. American District
Telegraph. For example, American District Telegraph had serviced
the fire alarms for some period of time - it had, in other words,
148. Cf. Ralph J. Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L.
REv. 1131 (1995).
149. 106 Idaho 787, 683 P.2d 435 (1984).
150. Id. at 790-91, 683 P.2d at 438-39.
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"acted." Should the fact that it stopped "acting" be determinative of
plaintiffs legal rights? If Knoblock had simply given up on his efforts
to straighten the well at some point - stopped acting - would Aren-
guena have been limited to his contractual claim? The ultimate prob-
lem is that the misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy is highly ma-
nipulable; it often becomes a conclusory label rather than a factual
description.
The Steiner court alternatively held plaintiffs negligence claim
was barred by the contract's exculpatory clause. The court rejected
the argument that the exculpatory clause should be voided as con-
trary to public policy because there was neither "an obvious disadvan-
tage in bargaining power" nor a "public duty" such as that imposed on
public utilities and common carriers. 15
1
Another irrigation-well case reached a similar conclusion. In
Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co.,'52 plaintiff contracted with de-
fendant for the sale and installation of an irrigation pump. The pump
was installed carelessly and plaintiff brought a negligence action for
the resulting crop losses. Without commenting on the choice, the court
treated the issue exclusively as a question of contract law and upheld
an exculpatory clause in the contract.'53
It is possible to distinguish the cases based on the existence of an
exculpatory clause in the service contract. Under this reading
Knoblock and Steiner simply establish contrary presumptions: when a
clause is included, it will generally be enforced; 54 when there is no
clause, on the other hand, there is a presumption that a service con-
tract includes "a common-law duty to perform with care, skill, rea-
sonable expedience, and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and
a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well
as a breach of the contract."'55
Similarly, the cases might be distinguished by the existence of a
"special relationship" between the parties. Although it is possible to
characterize the relationship between the pump repairer and the
pump owner as "special" - it is predicated upon a personal relation-
ship involving the expertise of the repairer and the reliance of the
151. Id. at 791, 683 P.2d at 439.
152. 93 Idaho 496, 465 P.2d 107 (1970).
153. Id. at 498-99, 499-500, 465 P.2d at 109-10, 111-12. Cf Anderson & Nafziger
v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 178-79, 595 P.2d 709, 712-13 (1979) (discussing
Rawlings). See also Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984).
154. The court has stated that such clauses will not be enforced when there is "an
obvious disadvantage in bargaining power" or defendant is engaged in a "public calling."
Steiner, 106 Idaho at 791, 683 P.2d at 439; Rawlings, 93 Idaho at 499-500, 465 P.2d at
111-12; Strong, 18 Idaho 389, 109 P. at 913.
155. Knoblock, 85 Idaho at 507-08, 380 P.2d at 901 (quoting 38 AM. JUlm Negli-
gence § 20 at 662 (1954)).
[Vol. 34
ECONOMIC LOSS IN TORT
owner - the relationship does not seem intuitively to be any more
special than that between the fire alarm installer and the building
owner. The difficulty. is that the designation of some relationships as
"special" tends to be conclusory because the court has provided little
explicitly on how to determine when a relationship is "special." Al-
though the court has stated that "[t]he 'special relationship' exception
generally pertains to claims against professionals who perform per-
sonal services, such as physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers
and insurance agents,""16 the court's application of the "special rela-
tionship" category has been broader than the traditional meaning of
the term "professionals." The court has found a special relationship
not only when physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers and insur-
ance agents are involved, but also when the service provider is a well
driller,'57 a pump repairer,158 an automobile repairer,159 a boiler re-
pairer," a water-heater installer, 6' an aircraft mechanic, 6 2 a
plumber,1' and a title company.6
The cases in which the court has found special relationships
share a web of recurrent factors rather than a finite list of elements.
As a threshold matter, the cases generally involve personal relation-
ships. As the court has noted, it is this personal element that distin-
guished the case from cases involving the sale of goods, cases that do
"not involve the rendering of personal services by one with specialized
knowledge and experience.' 1 65 In addition, the cases often involve
some expertise on the part of the defendant and a corresponding reli-
ance by the plaintiff coupled with a foreseeable risk that is within the
'expert's control. The court's statement in McAlvain about the rela-
tionship of the insured to the insurance agent is broadly applicable to
156. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 408, 848 P.2d 984, 992 (Ct. App. 1992) (ci-
tations omitted) (review denied (1993)).
157. Knoblock, 85 Idaho 503, 380 P.2d 898. Cf Hibbler v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007,
712 P.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1985) (expressing doubt on the application of the no-duty rule to
construction of a water system at a trailer court - an issue not assigned as error).
158. Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 682 P.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1984)
(review denied).
159. Dick v. Reese, 90 Idaho 447, 412 P.2d 815 (1966); see also Beare v. Stowes'
Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 317, 658 P.2d 988 (Ct. App. 1983).
160. S.H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973).
161. Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 655 P.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1982).
162. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975).
163. Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 415, 546
P.2d 54, 61 (1975).
164. Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 P. 612 (1912).
165. McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958
(1976) (emphasis added); see also Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539
P.2d 584, 589 (1975) ("In circumstances involving the rendition of personal services the
duty upon the actor is to perform the services in a workmanlike manner.'.
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these relationships: "Ordinarily, an insured will look to his insurance
agent, relying, not unreasonably, on his expertise in placing his in-
surance problems in the agent's hands.' 16 6 It is possible to substitute
"attorney" or "architect" or "accountant" for "insurance agent" without
distorting the sentence or its point. 'Well driller" and "automobile re-
pairer" also do not significantly misstate the underlying relationship
- nor, for that matter, does or should "fire alarm provider."
D. Poor Service: Service Contracts Between Defendant
and a Third Party
The second category of service contract cases involve the misper-
formance of a service contract between defendant and a third party;
breach of this contract results in economic loss to plaintiff. Can the
plaintiff recover her losses?
The cases fall into two, overlapping groups. In the first, defen-
dant breaches a contract to perform a service owed to a third party.
For example, a construction company contracts with a city to rede-
velop its blighted urban core and agrees both to take steps to mitigate
potential losses to businesses in the core and to complete the work by
a specified date. A business in the redevelopment area suffers eco-
nomic losses when customers avoid shopping at her store because the
construction company fails to meet its contractual obligations. 167
The second group of cases is a variation that has traditionally
been characterized as "misrepresentation.' ' 68 For example, a bank
contracts with an accounting firm to prepare a financial statement of
its business. The accountant prepares an audit; plaintiff subsequently
loans the bank money based on the audit. After the borrower-bank
goes into receivership, the lender sues the accountant.6 9
Although there are paradigmatically pure cases - cases in
which the misperformed service involves no misrepresentation and
misrepresentation cases that involve no misperformed service - the
two groups often overlap. That is, the misrepresentation in many
166. McAlvain, 97 Idaho at 780, 554 P.2d at 958.
167. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978).
168. Although these third-party cases are often categorized as negligent misrep-
resentation, it is important to note that these are not the only type of cases that can be so
characterized. For example, if the owner of an automobile takes it into a repair shop com-
plaining of strange noises and the repairer tells her, "Everything is just fine" when he has
no basis for his statement, the repairer's conduct might also be characterized as a negli-
gent misrepresentation. E.g., Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 164 A.2d 773 (N.J.
1960); see also Intermountain Constr. Co. v. City of Ammon, 122 Idaho 931, 841 P.2d 1082
(1992) (allegations that city had negligently misrepresented the cost of building permits).
169. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720
(1989).
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cases involves statements about a negligently performed service. Con-
sider, for example, the famous Cardozo opinion Glanzer v. Shepard.'
17
Plaintiff contracted to purchase 905 bags of beans from a third party,
agreeing to pay a specified price per pound. The seller contracted with
defendant to weigh the beans. Defendant provided both the seller and
plaintiff with a statement of the weight. Defendant unfortunately had
misweighed and plaintiff - who had overpaid - brought suit to re-
cover his loss. Cardozo characterized the facts as involving a misrep-
resentation. Defendant, in Cardozo's view, had misrepresented the
weight of the beans; for Cardozo, the issue was whether defendant
could be held liable for that misrepresentation in the absence of a con-
tract with the plaintiff. Note, however, that the case can with equal
accuracy be characterized as the negligent performance of service: de-
fendant had negligently misweighed the beans. 7 ' Similarly, in McAl-
vain v. General Insurance Co. of America,72 defendant's conduct can
be viewed either as the negligent performance of a service (insuring
the business) or as a negligent misrepresentation (representing that
the business had been fully insured).
1. "Pure" Services
The leading Idaho case is Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction
Co. 7 3 The construction company and the City of Idaho Falls entered
into a contract for the renovation of the city's blighted urban core. The
contract required defendant to take specified steps to minimize the
disruption to businesses in the area being renovated. Defendant failed
to comply with the mitigation measures and did not finish the renova-
tion in a timely manner. Plaintiff brought a contract action claiming
to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the company
and the city; it also joined a tort claim, contending that defendant's
negligent conduct had caused it economic loss. Citing concerns for
unlimited and disproportionate liability, the court refused to allow
plaintiff to recover in tort.7 4
170. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
171. The alternative characterization question extends beyond the third party
service contract context to include many service contracts in which there is a contract be-
tween the parties. For example, McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of America, 97 Idaho
777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976), can be viewed either as a negligent performance of a service
case (failing to insure the business fully) or a negligent misrepresentation case (misrepre-
senting the status of the insurance on the business).
172. Id.
173. 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978).
174. Id. at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005. The court, however, did hold that plaintiff was a
third-party beneficiary of the contract between defendant and the city. Id. at 467, 583
P.2d at 1002.
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The court's concern is the recurrent one: the fear that liability
will exceed fault. As the court noted in Just's, the traditional tort li-
ability-limiting mechanism - foreseeability - provides no real limit
in many pure economic loss situations: "In contrast to the recognized
liability for personal injuries and property damage, with its inherent
limitations of size, parties and time, liability for all the economic re-
percussions of a negligent act would be virtually open-ended." '75 If
Just's were permitted to recover, there would be no reason to deny re-
covery to Just's suppliers and creditors and its suppliers' suppliers
and creditors ad infinitum.
2. "Pure" Misrepresentation
The current Idaho law on recovery of economic loss for negligent
misrepresentation is traceable to two Cardozo decisions: Glanzer v.
Shepard76 - the bean weighing case - and Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co.177 In Ultramares, a company contracted with the
accounting firm Touche, Niven & Co. to prepare a certified balance
sheet of its assets and liabilities. The firm prepared thirty-two copies
of the audit, one of which was used to obtain a loan from Ultramares.
Unfortunately, the borrower was insolvent at the time of the audit
and the loan became a loss. Ultramares sued the accounting firm for
its negligence in completing the audit.
In Glanzer, the court held the bean weigher liable; in Ultra-
mares, the court refused to extend liability to the accountant because
"a thoughtless slip or blunder ... may expose [defendants] to a liabil-
ity in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an inde-
terminate class."'178 Cardozo distinguished Glanzer as involving a rela-
tionship between the bean weigher and the bean purchaser that was
"so close as to approach privity."'79 For the court, the privity substi-
tute served to limit the weigher's potential liability; no similar limit
was present in Ultramares.
The next significant case was decided in 1985 when the New
York Court of Appeals handed down Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co.'80 The case involved an extension of credit to a third
party based on a consolidated financial statement prepared by an ac-
counting firm. The court reexamined and reaffirmed its prior deci-
sions in Glanzer and Ultramares, concluding that an accountant could
175. Id.
176. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
177. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
178. Id. at 444.
179. Id. at 446.
180. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
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be held liable to a noncontractual party if three requirements were
satisfied: "(1) the accountant must have been aware that the financial
reports were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the
furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely;
and (3) there must have been some conduct on the part of the ac-
countants linking them to that party or parties."18' The court thought
that these requirements were a sufficient privity substitute that re-
stricted potential liability within manageable bounds.
The New York case law is relevant because of the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp. 112 Idaho
Bank & Trust was a negligence action brought by a lender against an
accounting firm that had been employed by the borrower to prepare a
financial statement of the borrower's business. The accountant pre-
pared an audit; The lender loaned money based on it. After the bor-
rower went into receivership, the lender sued the accountant. On ap-
peal from an order dismissing the claim, the court noted the unlim-
ited liability issue and then simply and without additional analysis
adopted the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Credit Alli-
ance.'1 The tripartite test for liability for negligent misrepresentation
thus became Idaho law.18 4
E. Tort Duties Owed to Third Parties
Although many pure economic loss cases lie on the boundary be-
tween tort and contract, this is not universally true. When one person
breaches a tort duty owed to a third party, that breach may affect the
economic interests of others. For example, when a person is killed or
injured in an automobile accident, the decedent's business partners
may well suffer economic loss as a result of the death or injury. Such
economic interests generally are not recoverable in tort. In Everett v.
Trunnell,'1 for example, the court summarily rejected such a claim,
noting that "a partnership has no right to recover for the negligent
injury to a partner."186
181. Id. at 118.
182. 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989).
183. Id. at 1083-84, 772 P.2d at 721-22.
184. The court subsequently reaffirmed its conclusion that negligent misrepre-
sentation, "as recognized in Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho at 1082,
772 P.2d at 720 (1989), is a viable cause of action in Idaho." Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho
474, 479, 797 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1990).
185. 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983).
186. Id. at 790, 673 P.2d 390. Cf Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Char-
tered, 98 Idaho Sup. Ct. Rep. 205 (1998) (plaintiff cannot recover for her collateral claims
for injuries allegedly done to her husband).
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The most extensive discussion of the rationale for this position
was set out in Cain v. Vollmer.'S Cain was the master of an appren-
tice jockey who sued for profits he lost as a result of physical injuries
to the apprentice. Although the court had previously allowed the
jockey to recover his lost wages, 8s it rejected the master's claim, em-
phasizing the distinction between the master's action for lost profits
and the jockey's action for personal injury and the resultant loss of
earning capacity:
In this case the one seeking damages is a race-horse man -
one who follows the races and enters his horses and . . . de-
pends on making his money by winning prizes in the various
races. That there is a wide difference between the nature and
character of damages asked in each of these cases cannot es-
cape the attention of anyone. The one is direct; the other is
proximate and dependant on innumerable secondary and in-
tervening causes. The jockey earned a salary and certain
sums for "outside mounts" whether he won the race or not.
This was his earning capacity. On the other hand, the jockey
alone cannot win the race; he must have a fleet horse. . and
upon the whole these imaginative profits may dwindle into
real losses.
... [T]he profits it is claimed appellant would have real-
ized depend on so many intervening circumstances and con-
tingencies, the unfavorable happening of any of which would
dissipate these prospective gains. We are fully satisfied that
prospective profits to a race-horse man for races that have
never been run and race meets and associations that have
never been held and against all contestants, is entirely too
remote, uncertain and indeterminable to be allowed.8 I
The court's concern is apparent: the economic losses that the race-
horse man sought were uncertain and therefore potentially unlimited.
In addition to this fear of speculative awards and unlimited li-
ability, the decision in cases such as Everett rest upon the common
law belief that tort actions are personal to the injured party"9 - a
belief that reflected the concern with limiting liability to reasonable
187. 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910).
188. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P.
1015 (1909).
189. Cain, 19 Idaho at 167-69, 112 P. at 687-88.
190. Moon v. Bullock 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944); Kloepfer v. Forch, 32
Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919).
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bounds. The combination of these concerns supports a broad prohibi-
tion against allowing recovery for losses attributable to the breach of
a tort duty owed to a third party rather than to the plaintiff.
F. Legislative Standards as a Source of Duty
An often-neglected category of cases involves a legislative stan-
dard that creates the applicable tort duty of care. This is a quite het-
erogeneous group of cases.
The loss may be caused by the misperformance of a service con-
tract between defendant and a third party when defendant is under a
statutory obligation to protect plaintiffs interests. For example, an
abstracter prepared an abstract of title to a parcel of land for the
landowner. The abstracter failed to note that the land had been mort-
gaged. Plaintiff purchased the land relying on the abstract. When he
was subsequently required to redeem the parcel, plaintiff brought an
action against the abstracter who argued that his liability was deter-
mined by contract and thus did not extend to plaintiff with whom it
was not in privity. In Merrill v. Fremont Abstract Co.,191 the court held
that this general rule had been abrogated by statute: "it was evidently
the intention of the Legislature to include within its protection any
person that might suffer damage by reason of the neglect or omission
of the abstracter . . .due to carelessness."'' 2 The statute, in other
words, created a tort duty owed to people not in privity of contract
with the title company.
In other situations, the statutory duty to protect against eco-
nomic loss may exist independently of contract. For example, in Op-
penheimer Industries v. Johnson Cattle Co.'"3 plaintiff had contracted
with Bohlen Cattle Company to care for cattle that Oppenheimer
owned. Bohlen subsequently rebranded some 1,681 head of cattle and
sold them at auction. When Oppenheimer discovered its loss, it
brought suit against the State Brand Board, contending that one of
the Board's inspectors had violated its regulations which required in-
spectors to demand proof of ownership when brands were "fresh." The
court agreed: the regulation imposed a duty on brand inspectors to
demand proof of ownership - and the beneficiaries of that duty in-
cluded cattle owners.19
191. 39 Idaho 238, 227 P. 34 (1924).
192. Id. at 244-45, 227 P. at 36.
193. 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1987).
194. Id. at 425, 732 P.2d at 663. The court's analysis in Oppenheimer is less than
clear. Although the court holds that the regulation creates a duty to protect cattle owners,
its decision muddles the distinction between property damage and economic loss by hold-
ing that the loss of the cattle was property damage. This is incorrect under Salmon Rivers
Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975), since
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By far the most common example of a legislatively created duty,
however, is the state's wrongful death act. The common law viewed
the claim arising from the breach of a tort duty as personal to the in-
jured person; as a result, the law did not recognize claims for injuries
resulting from the death of a third party. Decedent's heirs had no bet-
ter claim for their losses than did decedent's partners.'9 5 This was re-
versed by statute." As a result, a decedent's heirs may now recover
for their economic losses attributable to tortious conduct resulting in
the death.
V. A TRANSITIONAL SUMMARY
This brief review of the Idaho case law on recovery of economic
loss demonstrates that it is a good bit more complex than the general-
rule-with-two-exceptions explanation that the court presents in Duf-
fin - and even this more complex typology suffers from over-
precision. There are, for example, a not-readily-classifiable group of
decisions such as Hudson v. Cobbs.197 The case grew out of a complex
real estate transaction gone bad. Plaintiff purchased an office complex
only to discover that some of his "tenants" had signed sham advance
rental agreements into order to enable the seller to convert a short-
term loan into long-term financing and sell the property to him. After
the bank foreclosed, plaintiff brought an action seeking to recover for
negligent misrepresentation as well as fraud. The court held that the
only duty that the "tenants" had to the plaintiff was under the con-
tract to lease office space; plaintiffs claim was in contract and not in
tort.98 The examples could be multiplied.
Although incomplete, the typology does contain the majority of
economic loss cases. It also reveals the underlying policy concerns.
the cattle were the transactional property. As the court in Duffin tacitly acknowledged,
Oppenheimer's distinction between lost and damaged property is logically insupportable.
Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007 n.5, 895 P.2d at 1200 n.5. It thus is better to consider Oppen-
heimer to involve a statutory duty to protect against economic loss.
In a subsequent decision, the court has seemingly confused duties based on statu-
tory standards and duties based on the relationship between the parties. In Tomich v.
City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 901 P.2d 501 (1995), the owners of a small airplane that
was stored at a municipal airport brought an action to recover for the destruction of the
airplane when the tie-downs failed in a wind storm. The court affirmed a judgment for the
owner on the ground that there was a special relationship between the owner of the air-
plane and the owner of the airport. The court relied upon certain statutory obligation to
support its conclusion that there was a special relationship. The court, however, fails to
explain why statutes create a special relationship, seeming to confuse these two sources of
a duty in tort.
195. See Everett v. Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983).
196. IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1990).
197. 118 Idaho 474, 797 P.2d 1322 (1990).
198. Id. at 477-78, 797 P.2d at 1325-26.
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VI. POLICY AND RATIONALES
The case law reflects two dominant policy concerns. On the one
hand, the court has sought to preserve contract against the en-
croachment of tort. The prohibition against recovering pure economic
loss in tort serves this goal:
The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due
care to build a tractor that does not harm person or property.
If the defendant fails to exercise such due care it is of course
liable for the resulting injury to person or property as well as
other losses which naturally follow from that injury. However,
the law of negligence does not impose on International Har-
vester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough and
breaks down infrequently enough for Clark to make profit in
his custom farming business.1'
On the other hand, the court has also expressed repeated concern
over the potential for unlimited liability inherent in pure economic
loss situations. Again, the prohibition against recovering pure eco-
nomic loss in tort serves this policy goal:
[A] . .. rule, which would allow compensation for losses of
economic advantage caused by the defendant's negligence,
would impose too heavy and unpredictable a burden on the
defendant's conduct.
... In contrast to the recognized liability for personal
injury and property damage, with its inherent limitations of
size, parties and time, liability for all the economic repercus-
sions of a negligent act would be virtually open-ended. 00
The sometimes-conflicting, sometimes-reinforcing interaction of
these policies on the underlying rationales for tort and contract li-
ability accounts for at least part of the court's apparent scatter-shot
approach to pure economic loss cases.
A. Tort vs. Contract
1. Shoddy Goods
On a doctrinal level, cases involving the sale of goods present the
clearest situation in which the core principles of both tort and con-
199. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 336, 581 P.2d 784, 794
(1978).
200. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005
(1978) (citations omitted).
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tract support the same result: neither the potato seller nor the tractor
or shop buyer is endangered by their contractual partners - and
when person or property is not endangered, society's interest in im-
posing safety standards through tort law is not implicated.2"' Instead,
the buyers were disappointed by the quality of their contractual part-
ner's performance - and quality (i.e., warranty) is a contract concern.
As the court stated in Clark, tort is concerned with protecting persons
and property rather than with guaranteeing the purchaser a profit. 02
If plaintiff wants a profitable tractor, he must be sure that the seller
promises to provide him such a tractor.
Shoddy goods causing only economic loss thus creates the least
tension between tort and contract - and presents the simplest case
for the judiciary.2°3
2. Poor Service
Cases involving the misperformance of service contracts are im-
possibly diverse because the variety of services is so great: one person
hires another to drill a well, to teach children reading and mathe-
matics, to insure a business, to run a drill press, to install and main-
tain a fire alarm system, or to audit a company's books. Despite the
diversity, however, service contracts do share underlying similarities.
Most significantly, service contracts are employment contracts.
As such, they have a different feel than contracts for the purchase of
goods in which the purchaser and the manufacturer seldom meet face-
to-face. While the personal element in service contracts is declining
201. In Taylor, the court stated this distinction as the difference between mis-
feasing and nonfeasing, where defendant has not created a risk (misfeased) but simply
failed to act, it has not endangered plaintiff and thus has not invaded any tort interest.
Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho at 138-39, 483 P.2d at 669-70. The same concern is present in
Myers where the court of appeals refused to allow a tort action for property damage be-
cause the "injuries did not result from a calamitous event or dangerous failure of the
product." Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, 114 Idaho 432, 436, 757 P.2d 695,
699 (Ct. App. 1988) (review denied).
202. Clark, 99 Idaho at 336, 581 P.2d at 794.
203. In addition to this doctrinal basis, the court has also provided a rationale for
restricting recovery to contract claims based on the constitutional allocation of powers be-
tween the judicial and the legislative/executive departments of state government. As the
court noted in Clark, the legislature had enacted the Uniform Commercial Code which
"contains a comprehensive and finely tuned statutory mechanism for dealing with the
rights of parties to a sales transaction." Id. at 334, 581 P.2d at 792; see also Duffin, 126
Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200; Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 410,
690 P.2d 341, 345 (1984). To replace these statutory mechanisms with tort law would al-
ter the balance struck by the legislature - the UCC, for example, with its tolerance, if not
permissiveness, of disclaimers is generally more favorable to sellers - and would argua-
bly have a "corrosive effect" on the constitutional power granted to that body. Clark, 99
Idaho at 335, 581 P.2d at 793.
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with the rise of the service economy, service contracts remain more
personal because they involve some direct contact between the con-
tracting parties - a level of personal interaction that the purchaser of
a product seldom has with its manufacturer.
It is this rather imprecise difference - the personal nature of the
relationship - that forms the basis for the differing treatment of
service contracts. As the court has commented in a related context,
"the special relationship that exists between insurer and insured" is
based on "the unique 'personal' (non-commercial) nature of insurance
contracts.2 0 4 Of course not all service relationships give rise to a tort
duty of care; something more than a personal relationship is neces-
sary. That something more is covered by the unhelpful label of "spe-
cial relationships," a mixed group that includes relationships that
embody at least two different sets of recurrent factors. On the one
hand, there are relationships in which one person surrenders the
power to protect himself against a risk and thereby becomes depend-
ent upon another for his protection. Common carriers, innkeepers,
and other falling within the common-law category of "public callings"
are examples of this type of special relationship. The category, how-
ever, is broader than the common-law public-callings classification
since it includes a range of "custodial" relationships. °5 On the other
hand, there are relationships in which the service provider has some
expertise, specialized judgment or skill. Although the court has not
been either entirely clear or entirely consistent in its decisions in-
cluding or excluding service providers, the factors that appear to unite
the cases include the service providers special knowledge, judgment,
or skill in a field that lies outside the knowledge of the "reasonable
person" and that involves a risk of harm. Although such service pro-
viders are often professionals - doctors, lawyers, and architects -
the category also includes providers of specialized services such as
automobile mechanics, well drillers, boiler repairers, water-heater in-
stallers, and the like. Beneath the variability are a web of similari-
ties: a personal relationship involving control/expertise of a risk on
one side and dependence/reliance on the other.
The conclusion that a service provider owes a duty of care to the
service purchaser - that the relationship between them is "special"
204. White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 99, 730 P.2d 1014, 1019
(1986). Cf. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975)
("In circumstances involving the rendition of personal services the duty upon the actor is
to perform the services in a workmanlike manner." (emphasis added)); McAlvain v. Gen-
eral Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976) ("An insurance agent per-
forms a personal service for his client"; contracts for sale of goods do "not involve the ren-
dering of personal services by one with specialized knowledge and experience.'.
205. See, e.g., Merritt v. State, 108 Idaho 20, 696 P.2d 871 (1985) (jailer/inmate);
Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 331, 116 Idaho 586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989) (school/pupil).
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- is often consistent with both tort and contract rationales. On the
one hand, when a person (the service purchaser) either surrenders the
power to protect himself against a risk (the passenger on a common
carrier) or purchases the service because of the expertise of the pro-
vider in guarding against a risk (the lawyer for her knowledge of the
intricacies of drafting a will), imposition of a tort duty reinforces so-
cietal risk-reduction objectives. If the service provider were under no
duty of care to protect the service purchaser, the purchaser would be
largely unprotected. The imposition of a duty in such cases thus is
consistent with tort principles.
On the other hand, contract objectives are. also likely to be ad-
vanced in such cases because an obligation to act with due care is
likely to correspond to the parties' implicit understanding of the rela-
tionship: one purchases the common carrier's best efforts or the law-
yer's reasonable drafting ability. Indeed, courts are generally unwill-
ing to find liability under contract's no-fault theories of recovery. As
the court noted in a case involving an aircraft mechanic,
[i]n circumstances involving the rendition of personal services
the duty upon the actor is to perform the services in a work-
manlike manner .... "In both instances the standard of care is
imposed by law and under either [tort or contract] theor[ies]
there is no difference in the standard of care required of the
party rendering the personal service.
°2 0 6
Services, in short, generally are measured against a negligence, rea-
sonable-care standard - regardless of whether the court writes in
terms of contract or tort.2 07
B. Unlimited Liability
The second recurrent policy concern is the possibility of unlim-
ited or (at least) disproportionate liability. The commercially inter-
connected nature of modern society has increased the possibility that
a single event can spread decreasing .economic ramifications like wid-
ening circles through a pond of water. A moment's inattention could
206. Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975)
(quoting Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv., 427 P.2d 833, 840 (Alaska
1967)); see also Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 415, 546
P.2d 54, 61 (1975).
207. The rationale is often stated most clearly in cases asserting that a doctor
breached a contractual duty to cure the patient. In Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164,
168, 409 P.2d 110, 112 (1965), the court rejected such a claim, noting that "in the absence
of a specific agreement, an agreement of a practitioner with his patient is one for services
and treatment, not for a particular result." See also Ogle v. De Sano, 107 Idaho 872, 693
P.2d 1074 (Ct. App. 1984); Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932).
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result in devastating liability. The concern is not the size of the poten-
tial loss to any one person but rather the unknown potential extent of
liability, the unknown number of persons and companies that might
be injured. As the Idaho Supreme Court noted, allowing recovery of
pure economic loss might "impose too heavy and unpredictable a bur-
den" because, unlike liability for personal injury or property damage,
with their "inherent limitations of size, parties and time, liability for
all the economic repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually
open-ended."20 s
This concern is insignificant in cases in which there is a contract
between the parties. When defendant contracts to sell goods or to pro-
vide a service to plaintiff, privity provides a limit to potential liability.
While the defendant doubtless takes the plaintiff as she finds him,209
it is an identified plaintiff rather than an unknowable and indefinite
group of plaintiffs. This limitation is not present when defendant con-
tracts with a third party - particularly when the contract is for the
provisions of services that involve representations that can pass along
an unforeseeably convoluted- chain.
1. Shoddy Goods
When American Building Company (ABC) fabricated a metal
building to specifications provided by its local dealer,21 it doubtless
knew (at least in general terms) that there was a contractor and an
ultimate purchaser. Although ABC might not have known their ac-
tual identities, it at least knew that such entities existed and its po-
tential liability to them was bounded by the passage of the goods
down the distribution stream; the fact that ABC was unlikely to have
known the purposes for which Corrado purchased the building - and
thus the magnitude of his potential losses - is not problematic since
his generic identity was known. If economic losses were restricted to
these foreseeable parties - the contractor and ultimate purchaser -
the concern with unlimited liability would not affect decisions in
cases. Economic loss, however, is not so circumscribed: when the
building was unsuitable for Corrado's aircraft maintenance business,
Corrado was not alone in suffering economic losses. Commercial enti-
ties who would have used Corrado's service were forced to find alter-
native and potentially more costly alternatives; Corrado's parts sup-
208. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005
(1978); see also Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910).
209. See, e.g., Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 429 P.2d 397 (1967); Garrett v. Tay-
lor, 69 Idaho 487, 210 P.2d 386 (1949). There is no reason to assume that the traditional
rule is inapplicable to economic losses. The driver who runs down a millionaire can expect
to pay more than the driver who kills a bum.
210. Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984).
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pliers lost sales to Corrado for work that was not done; Corrado's sup-
pliers' suppliers also lost sales - the losses rippled outward in nearly
untraceable paths.
The nearly untraceable, speculative nature of the losses raises a
corollary concern: the potential for fraudulent claims. Corrado doubt-
less had a variety of potential suppliers. Which of those he would
have chosen had the building not been defective so that he could have
pursued his aircraft maintenance business is speculative - and the
speculative nature multiplies at each stage of the distribution chain.
Although this rippling effect is present in all economic loss cases in-
volving shoddy goods, when there is no contract between the parties
the courts lack a ready and principled reason (such as privity) to limit
liability. These concerns originally supported rules limiting recovery
in contract to parties in privity. While the significance of privity has
been substantially reduced in contracts for the sale of goods," there
are doubly sound policy reasons for maintaining the barrier when the
damages sought are such indirect economic losses.
2. Poor Service
When there is a contract between the parties for the provision of
a service, privity of contract provides a limit for potential liability by
identifying the affected party. When the court decides that a service-
based relationship is sufficiently "special" to be reinforced with a tort
duty, the existence of a contract between the parties offers a princi-
pled limit to the potential liability of the service provider.
When there is no contract between the parties, the threat of un-
limited liability becomes the overriding concern. In "pure" service
cases such as Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., the widening
circle of distributors and suppliers who lose sales raises this specter.
Although the court might have fashioned a principled privity substi-
tute in Just's - it did find the retailer to be a third-party beneficiary
of the contract between Arrington Construction and the City of Idaho
Falls 12 - the traditional negligence liability-limiting mechanism -
foreseeability - does not do so because the ever-widening circle of
loss is eminently foreseeable.
This problem is compounded when the service includes a repre-
sentation. When an accountant contracts with a company to prepare a
211. The Uniform Commercial Code and the Idaho Products Liability Reform Act
explicitly and implicitly remove privity requirements in transactions for the sale/purchase
of goods. See IDAHO CODE § 28-2-318 (1995) (express and implied warranties may not be
limited by seller when personal injuries occur); IDAHO CODE § 6-1407(1) (1990) (product
sellers other than manufacturers generally not liable when manufacturers are answer-
able for "harm" to claimants).
212. Just's, 99 Idaho at 466-67, 583 P.2d at 1001-02.
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financial statement, she has no control over and is unlikely even to
know of the uses to which the company may put the statement. If the
accountant is careless in preparing the statement, she is exposed to
potentially unlimited liability. Such concerns initially led courts per-
emptorily to deny liability. The per se denial of any liability seems un-
fair, however, in some situations. For example, if the accountant
knew the purposes for which the statement was prepared, concerns
for unlimited liability are less persuasive. In Glanzer v. Shepard,2 13
the bean weigher not only knew of the purpose of his weighing but
also knew the identity of the buyer; the relationship between weigher
and purchaser, the New York court subsequently wrote, was "so close
as to approach privity.'"' 4 When courts have found such principled
limits on liability, they have been willing to impose liability on those
whose negligent misrepresentations have caused economic loss to per-
sons with whom they are not in privity.2 5 This is, for example, the ex-
plicit rationale for the tripartite test in Credit Alliance:2 6 the prongs
of the test are designed to provide a nonarbitrary basis for restricting
liability within manageable limits.
3. Breach of Tort Duties Owed to Third Parties
Concern for unlimited liability also lies at the center of the cases
denying liability to third parties who suffer economic losses when a
defendant breaches a tort duty to a third party. When the Lewiston
Interstate Fair and Racing Association allowed Norman and his sister
Norma Vollmer to bring their greyhound onto the fair grounds, they
breached their duty to Benjamin Franklin McClain, Jr., a jockey in
the afternoon's races. McClain was permitted to recover for his eco-
nomic losses as well as his physical injuries when the Vollmer's dog
decided to join the race.211 McClain's employer, however, was denied
recovery of his economic losses. The court's evident concern was the
speculative and illimitable nature of the losses:
We are fully satisfied that prospective profits to a race-horse
man for races that have never been run and race meets and
associations that have never been held and against all con-
213. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
214. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931) (ex-
plaining the decision in Glanzer).
215. E.g., Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d
720 (1989).
216. Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
217. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P.
1015 (1909).
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testants, is entirely too remote, uncertain and indeterminable
to be allowed.2
1
C. Some Conclusions
When there is a contract between the parties, judicial concern fo-
cuses on preserving some space for contract in a tort universe; when
there is no contract between the parties, judicial concern focuses on
the potential for unlimited liability. Contrariwise, when there is a
contract between the parties, there is no significant concern for un-
limited liability; when there is no contract between the parties, the
concern to preserve some breathing space for contract is minimal.
Similarly, the tort concern for safety of person and property and
the contract attention to representations about the quality of the
bundles being exchanged interact in recurrent patterns. When safety
is threatened - particularly human safety - tort concerns are domi-
nant; endangered persons are a primary concern. When safety is not
an issue - when the person is disappointed rather than endangered
- contract considerations are more important.
Law, of course, is not mathematics. Individual cases require
judgment. But in applying that judgment, judges should be attentive
to underlying policies and the patterns they produce.
VII. DUFFIN: A REPRISE
Back to Duffin.
Recall that the Duffins purchased seed potatoes from Crater
Farms, Inc. (CFI) on the condition that the seed was "certified" by the
Idaho Crop Improvement Association (ICIA) as free of diseases and
pests. CFI delivered the potatoes to the Duffins in March and early
April, 1988. At the end of April, however, an ICIA inspection deter-
mined that the CFI potatoes were infected with bacterial ring rot;
ICIA therefore informed CFI that no further shipments could be sold
as certified. Neither CFI nor ICIA informed the Duffins of the prob-
lem. The Duffins subsequently discovered that their crop was infected
with bacterial ring rot. They brought suit against CFI in contract and
against ICIA for negligence, alleging that they had suffered a variety
of economic losses.219
The supreme court reversed the trial court's summary judgment
for ICIA, holding that ICIA had a duty to protect the Duffins against
economic loss because of the special relationship between the par-
218. Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 169, 112 P. 686, 688 (1910).
219. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1004-06, 895 P.2d
1195, 1197-99.
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ties.220 The court also held that the Duffins had failed to state a claim
for misrepresentation. 22' These two conclusions merit additional at-
tention.
A. Special Relationships
Although the court stated its intention to use Duffin "to define
the parameters of [the special relationship] exception," its analysis is
at best tantalizingly elliptical. 'The term 'special relationship,"' the
court wrote, "refers to those situations where the relationship be-
tween the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a
duty. In other words, there is an extremely limited group of cases
where the law of negligence extends its protections to a party's eco-
nomic interest.2 22 Unfortunately, however, the proffered standard -
"equitable" - advances the analysis only marginally since it is itself
subject to substantial uncertainty. Why, for example, is it equitable to
hold ICIA liable to the Duffins, a commercial enterprise with whom it
had no dealings? Are there factors or patterns to the types of relation-
ships that the court is willing to characterize as "special'? In short,
why is this relationship "special'?
It is, of course, possible to construct several explanations for the
court's use of the term: it may have felt, for example, that the Duffins
were less sophisticated than ICIA and thus deserving of additional
judicial solicitude. The court has in the past suggested that "an obvi-
ous disadvantage in bargaining power" might justify disregarding an
exculpatory clause. 2 13 But such speculation is problematic for at least
two 'reasons. Most fundamentally, it is speculation. The court has not
stated that some factor such as unequal bargaining power or lesser
commercial sophistication is the basis for its use of the term "equita-
ble." Second, if such concerns underlie the court's conclusion, it could
have as easily reached the conclusion within the context of contract
law which has quasi-tort concepts such a "unconscionability" and
"reasonableness" to handle such problems.
The basic difficulty is precisely this point: the court does not offer
guidance on the factors or factual patterns that give rise to the desig-
nation "special." This need not be a complete or a final list; it need not
be set in stone. Judging requires judgment and necessarily involves
220. Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
221. Id. at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203.
222. Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
223. E.g., Steiner Corp. v. American Dist. Tel., 106 Idaho 787, 791, 683 P.2d 435,
439 (1984); Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 499, 465 P.2d 107, 110
(1970).
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an occasional false start or wrong turn. But the court does need to
elucidate the factors that inform its judgment. 24
In place of an explicit discussion of parameters to the special-
relationship exception, the court offers a discussion of a single case:
McAlvain v. General Insurance Co. of America.22 5 McAlvain was a suit
by the purchaser of a hardware store against the real estate agent
who sold him the property. The defendant was also an insurance
agent and plaintiff requested defendant obtain sufficient fire insur-
ance to cover the property and its inventory. When a fire subse-
quently destroyed the building, the purchaser discovered that it had
not been completely insured; he brought an action in tort to recover
his losses. The supreme court affirmed a jury verdict for the pur-
chaser emphasizing the relationship between insurer and insured:
A person in the business of selling insurance holds him-
self out to the public as being experienced and knowledgeable
in this complicated and specialized field. The interest of the
state that competent persons become insurance agents is
demonstrated by the requirement that they be licensed by the
state, pass an examination administered by the state, and
meet certain qualifications. An insurance agent performs a
personal service for his client, in advising him about the kinds
and extent of desired coverage and in choosing the appropri-
ate insurance contract for the insured. Ordinarily, an insured
will look to his insurance agent, relying, not unreasonably, on
his expertise in placing his insurance problems in the agent's
hands. When an insurance agent performs his services negli-
gently, to the insured's injury, he should be held liable for
that negligence just as would an attorney, architect, engineer,
physician or any other professional who negligently performs
personal services.2
2 6
The court also noted that the personal nature of the relationship was
the factor that distinguished the case from cases involving the sale of
goods, cases that do "not involve the rendering of personal services by
one with specialized knowledge and experience." '27
The Duffin court characterized McAlvain as holding that a per-
son such as an insurance agent who "holds himself out to the public
as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and that, by do-
ing so, . . . induces reliance on his superior knowledge and skill" has a
224. Cf Dale D. Goble, Of Defamation and Decisionmaking: Weimer v. Rankin
and the Abdication of Appellate Responsibility, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1991).
225. 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976).
226. Id. at 780, 554 P.2d at 958 (citations omitted).
227. Id.
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duty to protect the person whose reliance is sought.22 8 That is, the
Duffin court read McAlvain to establish the principle that an expert
whose conduct induces reliance has a duty to protect the person who
relies from economic loss. The relationship between the Duffins and
IClA was analogous:
ICIA has held itself out as having expertise in the perform-
ance of a specialized function [and] it has engaged in a mar-
keting campaign ... the very purpose of which is to induce
reliance by purchasers on the fact that seed has been certified.
Under such circumstances, ICIA occupies a special relation-
ship with those whose reliance it has knowingly induced.
229
Thus, the court concluded, there was a special relationship between
the Duffins and ICIA that justified the imposition of a tort duty on
ICIA to protect the Duffins from economic loss.
In recapitulating McAlvain, the court subtly but significantly
shifted emphasis. While the McAlvain court gave at least equal
weight to the personal nature of the relationship between insured and
insurer, the Duffin court emphasized the purchaser's reliance on the
certifier's expertise. This shift in emphasis masks a dramatic shift in
doctrine.
Unlike all of the court's previous special-relationship cases, there
was no personal relationship between ICIA and the Duffins. Indeed,
there was no evidence that ICIA had ever had any contact with the
Duffins or that it even knew of their existence. ICIA dealt with seed
producers such as CFI; it did not deal with the purchasers of the seed.
In fact, the district court had dismissed the Duffins' misrepresenta-
tion claim because they had no evidence that "ICIA knew the Duffins
would rely on its representations. 2 0
Of course, the fact that the court has not previously found a spe-
cial relationship in the absence of a personal relationship does not
mean that it is powerless to do so or that the decision to do so is
flawed. The court might well choose to treat the "personal relation-
ship" element simply as one factor among several that are relevant to
the conclusion that the relationship is sufficiently special to impose a
duty. Nonetheless, the court abandons the requirement without any
discussion of the role that this element has played in previous deci-
sions - and thus appears not to have considered the potential prob-
lems that its new holding may encounter.
228. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
229. Id. In addition, the court concluded that a second defendant - the Federal-
State Inspection Service - had done nothing "actively... to induce reliance" and there-
fore did not have a special relationship with the purchasers of certified seed. Id.
230. Id. at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199.
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The personal nature of the relationship in special relationship
cases plays at least two roles. On the one hand, it provides the moral
justification for the imposition of a tort duty in addition to the as-
sumed contractual duties. As the court in McAlvain stated, the per-
sonal element in "special relationships" is the distinguishing factor
that sets special-relationship cases apart from the sale of goods cases
such as Taylor v. Herbold.231 The court has emphasized 'the unique
'personal"' nature of the concept in a variety of contexts.2 32 There are,
of course, other rationales that can justify the imposition of a duty -
the court in Duffin, for example, emphasizes ICIA's conduct that was
intended to induce reliance.
A second - and perhaps even more important - role is that the
personal nature of the relationship serves to limit potential liability.
The imposition of a duty without some limit raises the specter of "too
heavy and unpredictable a burden" because liability for "the economic
repercussions of a negligent act would be virtually open-ended.'1
33
When a service provider knows the service purchaser, the provider's
potential liability is necessarily circumscribed. Abandoning the re-
quirement that the relationship be personal also abandons the im-
plicit liability limitation: ICIA, for example, is potentially liable to all
purchasers of certified seed - an indeterminate group.
There are other mechanisms that the court might employ to limit
liability in a principled manner. The court in Duffin offers that reli-
ance as a limiting mechanism, stating that ICIA "occupies a special
relationship with those whose reliance it has knowingly induced.' It
seems unlikely, however, that induced reliance can successfully fill
the role of liability-limiting mechanism. The conduct cited by the
court to justify its holding - ICIA held itself out, it knew that certi-
fied seed had a higher value, it engaged in a marketing campaign for
certified seed2 35 - does not provide a limitation on potential liability
comparable to the abandoned personal relationship. Under the court's
approach, ICIA became potentially liable to every potato farmer in the
231. Cases involving the sale of goods do "not involve the rendering of personal
services by one with specialized knowledge and experience." McAlvain v. General Ins. Co.
of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976). Taylor involved the breach of con-
tract to purchase potatoes. Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 483 P.2d 664 (1971).
232. White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 99, 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1986)
(bad faith claim involving insurance contract); Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97
Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 584, 589 (1975) (aircraft mechanic).
233. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005
(1978); see also Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Idaho 163, 112 P. 686 (1910).
234. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201 (emphasis added). But recall
that the trial court had found that there was no evidence that "ICIA knew the Duffins
would rely on its representations," id. at 1006, 895 P.2d at 1199, a finding that raises
questions about "knowingly induc[ing]."
235. Id.
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state - "a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class.
2 36
Furthermore, the court's citation of Glanzer as an example of
such knowing inducement is problematic because Glanzer is inappli-
cable: both the crucial factual predicates and the justification for the
decision turn on the personal relationship between the bean weigher
and the purchaser. The weigher not only knew the identity of the pur-
chaser but also personally provided him with a copy of the weight re-
ceipt.3 7 It was this fact that prompted Cardozo to characterize his de-
cision in Glanzer as involving a relationship "so close as to approach
privity.,13 8 It was this personal relationship between the weigher and
purchaser that provided a substitute for privity and allowed the court
to impose a tort duty on the weigher. In Duffin, the evidence indicates
that ICIA had never had any contact with the Duffins or any knowl-
edge of them as individuals. The reliance that ICIA induced in the
Duffins was no different than the reliance it 'Induced" in thousands of
potato farmers. This reliance provides no significant limitation to po-
tential liability. The court's abandonment of the personal element of
special relationships thus is problematic because it offers no apparent
basis for limiting ICIA's liability.
The potential thus created for unlimited liability is part of a
more basic difficulty. The court has mischaracterized the essential na-
ture of the case. Not only was there no personal relationship between
ICIA and the Duffins, there was no privity between the parties: ICIA
had not contracted with the Duffins to certify the potatoes. Rather, it
had contracted with CFI to provide testing and certification services.
The case thus involves a service contract between defendant and a
third party - it is, in other words, analogous to cases such as Just's23 9
and Idaho Bank &Trust 24 ° rather than to McAlvain.2 41
This problem implicates the court's second decision - the con-
clusion that the Duffins did not state a claim in negligent misrepre-
sentation.
236. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
237. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
238. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (1931).
239. Just's held that a business located in a city's blighted urban core could not
recover in tort for business losses traceable to the breach of a contract between the city
and a construction company that was redeveloping the core. Just's, 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d
997.
240. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp., 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720
(1989).
241. In McAlvain, defendant had a contract with plaintiff to insure his business;
that contract provided the basis for a relationship between the parties that the court
thought sufficiently special to justify the imposition of a tort duty in addition to the con-
tractually assumed duties. McAlvain, 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955.
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B. Negligent Misrepresentation
The Duffins also predicated their case on a claim for negligent
misrepresentation. The district court had granted summary judgment
on this claim and the supreme court affirmed summarily: "we ex-
pressly hold that, except in the narrow confines of a professional rela-
tionship involving an accountant, the tort of negligent misrepresenta-
tion is not recognized in Idaho.
2 42
The difficulty with this summary decision is that Duffin in fact is
a negligent misrepresentation case. The defining characteristic of
such cases is that defendant has a contract with a third party to pro-
vide that person with a service - weighing beans in Glanzer, pre-
paring a certified balance sheet in Ultramares, or preparing a finan-
cial statement in Idaho Bank & Trust - the service is performed
negligently - the beans are misweighed or insolvency is undetected
- and the representation that embodies the completed service - the
receipt or balance sheet or financial statement - reaches the plaintiff
who relies upon it to her detriment. This is what occurred in Duffin:
ICIA contracted with CFI to test its seed potatoes so that they could
be certified if they met the requirements; ICIA failed to detect the
presence of bacterial ring rot in the potatoes and negligently certified
them; the Duffins relied upon the certification - a representation
that they were disease-free - to their detriment.
The court, of course, has the power to extend liability and to craft
new exceptions. In previous cases, the court has relied upon the spe-
cial-relationship concept to justify the imposition of a tort duty in ad-
dition to the parties' assumed contract duties and there is nothing in-
herently troubling about relying upon the special-relationship concept
as the basis for allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentation. A
special relationship can readily serve as a privity substitute to limit
liability -- this was after all the rationale in Glanzer.2 43 But Glanzer
involved a personal relationship: the bean weigher not only knew the
identity of the purchaser but also provided a copy of the weight re-
ceipt to him personally.
This, then, is the ultimate problem with the court's decision in
Duffin: the court both expanded the special-relationship concept by
removing the requirement that there be a personal relationship be-
242. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1010, 895 P.2d at 1203. The decision to which the court
implicitly refers is Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d
720 (1989), where the court held that an accountant can be held liable for negligent mis-
representation under limited circumstances. While the court's statement is absolute, the
facts of the case do not rule out maintaining a claim for negligent misrepresentation
where the person had suffered either personal injury or property damage.
243. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
[Vol. 34
ECONOMIC LOSS IN TORT
tween the parties and extended it to a new group of cases in which
there was no privity between the parties. This means that the court
creates the potential for unlimited liability because both the personal
nature of the relationship and privity that had previously served to
limit liability are no longer required.
Additionally, the policy concerns that traditionally have domi-
nated this area of law do not justify the extension. The Duffins were
not endangered by the potatoes; the tort concern for safety of person
or property was not implicated. Instead, the Duffins were disap-
pointed by the quality of the seed potatoes because they were not as
they were represented to be - the traditional contract concern. Given
this, it is difficult to see why the Duffins should not be left to the con-
tract they had with the seller, CFI.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
There seems to be a natural desire to compose sweeping summa-
ries: "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a
movement from Status to Contract";2 44 or: "Contract ... is dead";2 45 or,
again: "economic loss generally cannot be recovered in torts.2 46 The
difficulty with such statements - however much apparent order they
may bring at a global level - lies in the loss of detail.
The Idaho Supreme Court's desire to write a simple summation
of the law on recovery of economic loss in tort led it into oversimplifi-
cation. Not only has the court previously allowed recovery of economic
loss in more than two limited exceptions, but it has also developed a
far more complex body of law on the question. Duffin's oversimplifica-
tion of that body of case law raises significant questions: what does
the court mean when it speaks of a "special relationship"? Its nod to
"equitable" and its emphasis on expertise and induced reliance, seem
unbounded when stripped of the requirement that the relationship be
personal. Similarly, the court's extremely summary disposition of the
negligent misrepresentation claim is problematic, since Duffin itself
seems to be such a claim. How is the court's rejection to be under-
stood? And if Duffin is not a negligent misrepresentation case, does it
sub silencio overrule Just's since both cases arise out of the breach of
a contract with a third party?
Ultimately, this article is a plea that the court require more.
Idaho has more than a century's worth of tort cases. They form a rich
narrative that examines recurring issues from a variety of perspec-
tives. The question of whether economic loss should be recoverable in
244. HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 182 (Frederick Pollock new ed. 1930) (1861).
245. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 3.
246. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007, 895 P.2d at 1200.
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tort actions, for example, has been discussed in the context of contract
between the parties for the sale of goods or services, in the context of
contract for the sale of goods or service where the parties to the suit
are not the parties to the contract, and when there is no contract.
Each of these situations involves different factual issues; they raise
different policy concerns. The court should not be too quick to lump
this variety into a simple general-rule-with-two-exceptions pigeonhole
- to do so is to lose the learning that is embodied in the narrative.
Rather, the court should add to the narrative, enriching the jurispru-
dence by adding its own stories, its own explanations.
